The State, the Nation, Nationalism, and the Interstate Federalist Tradition

Joseph Solis-Mullen

War made the state, and the state made war.
—Charles Tilly, 1990
From *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992*

It is the state which makes the nation, not the nation the state.
—Józef Piłsudski, 1918
From Eric Hobsbawm's *The Age of Empire*

I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community.
—Benedict Anderson, 1983
From *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*

J. Solis-Mullen (✉)
History Department, Poling Center, Spring Arbor University, Spring Arbor, MI, USA
e-mail: Joseph.solis-mullen@arbor.edu

Forgetting, and I would even say historical error, are an essential factor in the creation of a nation, and so it is that progress in historical studies is often a danger to nationality.
—Ernest Renan, 1882
From *What is a Nation?*

Introduction

Attempting to trace the evolutions of the state and nation is to embark on an investigation with no clear markers, no event or figure delineating a clear change in the form of any. From the Treaties of Westphalia to Woodrow Wilson, the French Revolution to the European Union, all were the product of processes whose antecedents stretch back hundreds of years and are interconnected in myriad ways to developments in transportation, communication, science, warfare, economics, politics, and society. For all the difficulties analyzing their evolutions present, however, the basic argument of this chapter is straightforward: that each was a gradually developed structural innovation whose purpose, sometimes consciously pursued and sometimes not, was increasing centralized control in the name of increasing the power projection capabilities or survivability of the entity in question during a period defined by "Great Power" competition, "State Death," and fights for statehood among emerging nationalist groups. To varying extents and degrees, this typically involved the systematic marginalization or elimination of difference, which more than anything else defined what might, for simplicities sake, be called the "states" and "nations" of pre-Modern Europe. As will be shown, these were not states in the Modern sense; nor, with some potential exceptions, were the inhabitants of those geographically situated political entities conscious members of a single nation. Lacking any shared literary tradition and divided by ethno-linguistic, religious, and regional allegiances the kingdoms of the European continent were amalgamations of peoples whose immediate concerns and identifying markers were overwhelmingly local.

To avoid any confusion as regards terminology, a few general definitions order. Following the conventions of Connor (1978) and others,

particularly Hobsbawm (1983, 1991, 2021) and Anderson (2016), the following three terms central to the topic at hand should be understood here as follows:

- State: the major territorial political sub-unit of the globe
- Nation: a people bound together by a common ideology, customs, ethnicity, invented traditions, or other identifiers that differentiate its members from those of other groups
- Nation-State: the people of a state share a sense of common national identity

As should be clear from these definitions, no one implies the other. Nor is any one dependent on any other. To take just a few examples: the Kurds of present-day Iraq, Syria, and Turkey constitute a nation without a state, the archipelagic Indonesia a state without a nation, while the insular and ethno-linguistically homogeneous Japan meets virtually every possible criteria for nation-state status.

Though war was central to the development of the Modern state and nation in Europe (Kennedy 1989; Tilly 1975, 2002), it was not by itself sufficient. Afterall, war long preceded the Modern Period, approximately 1500–1945, during which these concepts developed. The same is true of mythmaking, storytelling, the construction and perpetuation of a narrative about who and what a given community are and what makes them so. It was the unification of these two factors under a specific set of geographical, material, political, and ideational circumstances that produced the world of states, nationalities, and nationalisms of the present day. For the competitive cauldron of Europe's evolved political polycentrism (Scheidel 2021) favored these vehicles of group survival and individual advancement for their ability to mobilize resources and command (or effectively coerce) loyalty. The layout of the chapter is designed to illustrate this by charting the development of the rationalized bureaucratic state from the feudal medieval kingdom, with the preservation of certain key institutions; the breakdown of local, family, and religious ties in favor of a patrimony of nationalism; the technological and social innovations that made this possible; the external and internal pressures that compelled it; and to examine the prospects for

liberty in the interstate-federalist tradition given the forces that made the contemporary world and still dominate it: the state, nation, and nationalism.

The "Great Divergence" and the Foundations of Modern Europe

The eradication of difference within the loosely unified kingdoms that emerged from the Late Middle Ages (1250–1500) was central to the process of building the war-making capacity of the nascent European states (Davies 1996; Fukuyama 2011; Lafrance and Post 2019; Tilly 1975). A dizzying array of noble and clerical privileges that greatly impeded internal trade and the levying of taxes by the monarch needed to be rationalized, negotiated away, or otherwise eliminated; the power of guilds and trade associations reduced in order to realize the conditions conducive to early industrialization and capitalism; and the multitude of local and regional languages replaced by a single lingua franca. For example, the French Kingdom of the fifteenth century had no "French" language to speak of; local and regional dialects abounded, surviving in some cases to the present day, with the various Occitan dialects still claiming more than a million speakers. As elsewhere in Europe, the trades were monopolized, innumerable internal tariffs impeded commerce between regions, and the French kings had no power to directly level taxes on the majority of the wealth within their realm, held principally by the clergy and nobility. Far from being absolute monarchs the rulers of the early Modern kingdoms of Europe were constricted at virtually every turn, dependent on the willingness of others nominally under their control to fulfill their evolved social, economic, and political obligations to the ruler.

Indeed, the Spanish Crown's early success at state and empire building (1469–1700) is largely explained by its ability to effectively work through or around these interlocking restraints on central authority (Kennedy 1989; Payne 2011). First, after uniting Spain Ferdinand and Isabella worked with the Catholic inquisitors to steadily suborn or remove its Muslim and Jewish populations, thereby socially homogenizing their

subjects to a significant degree. Second, taking advantage of its relative geographic isolation from the rest of Europe by the Pyrenees, as well as its ideal seaward geography, the Spanish Crown was able to put off making difficult domestic fiscal decisions by instead financing its imperial expansion by leveraging the massive revenues coming in from the mines its conquistadores had taken in South America. So it was that while the French and English were beset by internal religious conflicts and elites resistant to paying the taxes necessary to fund the increasingly important but capital intensive navies and gunpowder armies, the Spanish Crown was largely free from both. While this provided a temporary advantage, it would prove a handicap in the longer run competition against its rivals. In arguably the first modern example of the resource curse, successive Spanish monarchs made no effective effort to reform its horribly inadequate system of taxation within the Kingdom. Freed from the need to negotiate with its subjects for additional revenues, the steady inflow of easy American silver into the state's coffers enabled unchecked spending on a series of military misadventures, such as the ill-fated armada (1588), that ultimately sapped the strength of the Spanish Empire at the same time the English, Dutch, and French were undergoing the often fraught internal renegotiation of relations between sovereign and subject that ultimately left them stronger than before.

While these often built on recognized, and sometimes formally codified, local arrangements with origins in the Early and High Middle Ages, this became increasingly the case as the Protestant Reformation began to spread across north and central Europe in the early sixteenth century. Though the local conditions for a revolt against the Church in Rome had been present for arguably a century, as the Church's teachings rang increasingly hollow in the face of its representatives clearly un-Christ-like behavior, from open displays of opulence and corruption, to its political intrigues and hostility to reform, it took the arrival in Europe of mass moveable type to turn the not infrequent local disputes over rights or obligations, often with religious overtones, into decades of continent-spanning war (Wedgwood 2005). Appropriately, it was ultimately the attempted sale of indulgences by Pope Leo X to finance military campaigns to expand the domain of the papal states on the Italian peninsula that provided the occasion for Luther's attack on the

practice (1517). The following century and a half of war within and between states over, implicitly or explicitly, confessional matters was to include the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), the most destructive the continent would see until the Wars of the French Revolution and First Empire of Napoleon.

Arguably the most important legacy of the "wars of religion," which are thought to be responsible to for the deaths of several millions in, particularly central and eastern, Europe, was the significant reduction in interstate war between the heads of the major European powers over religious pretexts. While some minor conflicts with overt or implicit religious motivations would continue sporadically until the early eighteenth century, and would flare up again in the later nineteenth century in Italy and in the Balkans, in Europe political and military conflict became strictly the domain of secular authorities. Notable exceptions aside, these took increasingly little consideration of religion in geopolitical calculations, with the Catholic French King Francis I entering into formal alliance with the Islamic Ottoman Sultan as early as 1536 in order to fight their common (Catholic) Habsburg enemy.

The separation of church and state, an important evolved legacy of the Middle Ages and early Modern period, effectively eliminated the possibility of theocracy in Europe. Even if at times and places, such as Spain in the sixteenth century, the state and church acted effectively as one, both at home and abroad, the overwhelming trend was toward the autonomy of political elites. As with the failure of the Catholic Church to suppress the early Lutheran agitations, which were effectively backed by German princes seeking more control for themselves, the Papacy's fights with Henry VIII of England (1527) and Henry IV of France (1587) were conclusively decided in favor of the secular authorities (Davies 1996). Particularly with the concurrent advances in military affairs, which made asserting an effective monopoly of violence by central authorities more possible, various of Europe's nobles, ecclesiastics, and subjects were willing, in exchange for rights and protections, to accede to their primacy. This trend toward increasingly centralized secular authority within a limited framework of rights and obligations aside, the church could and did still act as a limited check on secular power. In Catholic France, for example, it had an explicit role in the

Estates. Christianity more generally was also to remain central to the order of European societies, while abroad Christian authorities would find considerable scope for new crusading in the form of missionary work in the Americas and east Asia.

Apart from opportunities to proselytize, the expansion of the European empires abroad during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries began to transform the lives of those in Europe in profound ways. This was primarily to be seen in improved diets leading to population growth as well as an increase in the money economy. Given the existing evolved institutional frameworks in certain polities, these enabled capital accumulation, and eventually economic growth, that parabolically departed all previous trend lines. Indeed, particularly in western Europe, many of the necessary preconditions for the emergence of the liberal bourgeois capitalist societies of nineteenth century revolutionary nationalism had been firmly established by the end of the late Middle Ages (1300–1500): from private property and complex financial institutions to legal and land reforms, experiments in representative government and early advances in manufacturing, feudal societies were gradually being transformed.

The Dutch Republic, effectively independent of Habsburg Spain from the Union of Utrecht onward (1579), was the first to combine the effective benefits of the period into a recognizably modern and conscious nation-state. Its neighbor, France, was to undergo a different, though equally effective, state-making process over the following century, with the Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin in particular working to erode the autonomy of the nobility, whose failed rebellions (1648 and 1653) paved the way for the reign of Louis XIV. The differences between the Dutch and French states in terms of their developments illustrates how some forces of the period impacted on certain areas more strongly than others, impacted at different times, or whose effects manifested themselves in different ways given existing local conditions.

Landmarks on the Road to State Formation

The tendency or desire for sweeping narratives about the formation of the modern state system in Europe regularly leads to a great deal of emphasis being placed on the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). However, as Osiander (2001) points out, a close examination and contextualization of the collection of treaties that ended the Thirty Years War reveals that these agreements were hardly revolutionary, in that they did not significantly break with past practices and would not form an ironclad template for relations between polities going forward. Concretely, the settlement imposed a recognition of parts of the Peace of Augsburg (1555), which had at least nominally granted the right of each prince within the Holy Roman Empire to choose the religion of their given principality; however, in a concession to the proto-democratic social forces of the period, and to constitutional limitations on monarchs, it stripped the ruler of the right to impose that choice upon their subjects. Important and trend-confirming as the concession to religious liberty was, one must not lose sight of the other, perhaps less desirable, continuities with past practices; specifically, the treaties of 1648 made a number of territorial adjustments which were resisted and thereafter almost immediately challenged, most notably by then-burgeoning Swedish Empire which sought to seize the Hanseatic town of Bremen in a series of ultimately unsuccessful campaigns (1654–1666). Further, the agreements granted the explicit right to several outside powers to intervene in the Holy Roman Empire if any felt various terms were not being upheld to their satisfaction. This was, in short, far from the theoretical autonomy of the nation-state which was to be variously achieved in most of western and central Europe by the first decades of the twentieth century.

In short, while the Treaty of Westphalia was an important event of the period, bringing to an end some of the worst warfare Europe would see for a century and half, and in the process helping to substantially normalize relations between the old Catholic and new Protestant territories, viewed in their proper context and in their own terms the treaties of 1648 were but one of a series of events on the road to the formation of the recognizable nation-states of a modernized industrial Europe. Though they did not radically depart from prior practices nor entirely

revolutionize relations between or within the various kingdoms of early Modern Europe, the conflict did critically sap the strength of the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs at the same time it provided a crucible for the series of advances in military affairs of the period that would be more effectively exploited by others (Parker 1996).

Like the decline of Habsburg and Spanish power, these developments in military tactics took place over a prolonged period beginning with the introduction of gunpowder to Europe via the Ottomans, who used the ninth century Chinese invention to blast through the walls of the hitherto impregnable Constantinople in 1453. These changes in how warfare was conducted on the battlefield were evolved to make better use of the technological breakthroughs in portable firearms and artillery, and featured changes in fortifications, infantry formations, and eventually the overall size of armies. This at the same time the increasing range and power of artillery mounted onboard ships enabled the various European Empires, such as the Portuguese, Dutch and English, to increasingly dominate the trade routes of the Indian Ocean on the way to the archipelagic spice islands, India, and China. Hitherto, the impact of goings on in these waters on Europe had been negligible. Not until the loss of Constantinople, the last vestige of the Roman Empire, to Muslim Turks, did these become the focus of particular Iberian monarchs and navigators who feared Europe's overland cutoff from Asia. When, using innovations in deep water sailing and navigation, the first Spanish and Portuguese merchant marines rounded the southern tip of Africa (1488), they found an Indian Ocean bustling with trade; from the east African coast, ports on the Arabian Peninsula in places like modern day Oman, India, and China the now heavily armed Europeans were virtually invincible on the water (Sharman 2019).

As evidenced by the various Europeans' early and easy assertion of control over these vital waterways, considerable advantage was to be gained by those political entities most capable of adopting and applying the new material technologies and tactics of war. Their acquisition and maintenance did not come easily, however; apart from material constraints and technical problems, they required social and economic innovations as well. Apart from the fiscal settlements and sophisticated financial innovations required to reliably generate the increasingly large

sums required to create and sustain such armaments and forces during prolonged conflicts, which granted a particular advantage to England following the Glorious Revolution (1688) and creation of the Bank of England (1694), they required an increasingly skilled and literate population. Here, the prior century's proliferation of moveable type and the mass circulation of vulgate print, spurred by the radically democratizing Protestant Christianity, helped kickstart the mass literacy that would later be critical to both industrialization and, later, nationalism. And, in an era when a likely use of a monarch's military was to be in putting down a popular or peasant uprising, these combined developments further favored political authorities whose legitimacy was so recognized that it could command the loyalty of increasingly large numbers of men; better still if they could all be commanded in a single language. In short, they could be best exploited by nations of citizens rather than loosely conjoined collections of subjects.

What Is a Nation?

Little has been said thus far regarding nationality and its attendant phenomenon of nationalism, or patriotism. This is in large part because, as scholars from Renan to Anderson have noted, it took the emergence of widely literate societies to standardize and spread the unifying stories of a given people; to say nothing of the popular press, with its abundant newspapers and periodicals, which as politics and societies of Europe liberalized emerged to shape, follow, and cater to various aspects of public opinion. This was especially true of nationalism, one of the hallmarks of the emergence of a movement being the devotion of journals to the cause, whether the focus be literary, historical, philological, or otherwise (Hobsbawm 1962). For unlike the kingdom or state, which could be pointed to on a map, the "national question," as it was sometimes called, eluded such specific definition. As the English journalist Walter Bagehot is said to have put it: "We know what it is when you do not ask us, but we cannot very quickly explain or define it" (1872). Indeed, the concept was slow in growing and took on a variety of forms, from the

collection of folktales to philological investigations and historical treatises. And it was championed by differing social orders depending on the given circumstances. From Germanic Lutheran pastors collecting the fables of Estonian peasants to the gentry and middling landowners of the Hungarian lands of Habsburg Austria, what eventually developed and cohered under the pens of budding political theoreticians in the decades following the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic period was a concept of nationality distinct from anything that had previously existed (Hobsbawm 1975).

Though distinct cultural entities such as the Jews and Confucian Han Chinese have existed for millennia, the modern nation as it developed ideationally in Europe had several distinct characteristics that when combined differentiated it from its historical antecedents elsewhere. Among them was an emphasis on language and the written word as a preserve of the nation; ties to specific bloodlines or specific places could simultaneously be intermingled with missionary and universalist aspect. As the avid Russian nationalist Dostoyevsky has Shatov put it:

> If a great people does not believe that the truth is only to be found in itself alone (in itself alone and in it exclusively); if it does not believe that it alone is fit and destined to raise up and save all the rest by its truth, it would at once sink into being ethnographical material, and not a great people. A really great people can never accept a secondary part in the history of Humanity, nor even one of the first, but will have the first part. A nation which loses this belief ceases to be a nation. But there is only one truth, and therefore only a single one out of the nations can have the true God, even though other nations may have great gods of their own. Only one nation is 'god-bearing,' that's the Russian people. (From *Demons*, or *the Possessed*, written 1871)

Second was the idea that only through creation of its own state could the nation realize its fullest expression. This idea, which had its origins in the French Revolution and in the writings of Rousseau (1762), was to prove particularly problematic to the heterogeneous Austrian Habsburg domains of southern and eastern Europe. What, after all, could be the "general will" of such a political entity? Accustomed to largely living by their own customs and to speaking their own patois, they grew

increasingly restless under the campaign of Magyarization directed out of Budapest (1867–1914), culminating in a series of crises that eventually helped produced the spark of the First World War (Tuchman 2012). Even those more historically and geographically rooted peoples with more or less continually existing institutions, such as the English, underwent many of the same painful assimilative processes that keep the Balkans a powder keg to the present day. In the case of the English, eventually British, monarchy, many of its present practices date no later than the nineteenth and even twentieth centuries, illustrating the fluidity of such socio-political constructs (Hobsbawm 1987).

Even once the idea of a specific land belonging to a specific people had become generally accepted, there was no ready agreement as to which nations should have their own states. Apart from cultural, ethnic, linguistic, historical, or institutional considerations was the question of the hypothetical nation-state's viability, that is its ability to field the requisite financial and military resources to sustain itself in the fierce arena of nineteenth century geopolitical struggle. As the Irish and Polish cases demonstrated, however, size notwithstanding the interests and demands of the Great Powers were always the first to be satisfied. Beyond that, opinions as to how Europe might be thus effectively divided varied; the Italian revolutionary Giuseppi Mazzini envisioned a Europe of eleven, or perhaps twelve, nation-states; while Woodrow Wilson would later, at the Versailles Conference, argue for a Europe constituted of more than twenty. In any case, whether relatively ancient or recent, the sociopolitical structures of European states during the nineteenth century increasingly tended toward the modern, industrialized, nation-state framework. Though they often did so under democratic pressures, much like the adoption of the new military technologies and tactics that enabled a handful of European monarchies to dominate the globe, the effective adoption, or inculcation, of nationalism by ruling elites increased the power projection capabilities of their state or nation. Indeed, the beginning of this process is to be found in the rationalization of France's political, social, and economic institutions during its Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, as well as in the measures adopted by its rivals as they struggled to combat the new revolutionary invention of the "nation under arms."

The Nation-State Takes Shape

Prior to the French Revolution and its levée en masse, which likely mobilized something close to a half million men for war against France's enemies, it would have been inconceivable for any ruler in Europe to so arm and mobilize its population. At a time when armies consisted largely of foreign mercenaries and an officer corps of old sword nobility, desertions were common among the rank and file with whippings administered as a regular form of discipline. Though not as popular as the propaganda from the revolutionary councils of Paris proclaimed, particularly in the heavily Catholic southwest, the draft succeeded militarily because, in the perhaps apocryphal words of Napoleon, "quantity has a quality all its own." Of singular advantage, too, was the willingness of the French Republic's leadership to dismiss distinctions of social rank in favor of ability and the hitherto normal constraints on central authority when it came to such matters as military mobilization and requisitioning. The British Crown, for example, could not simply command its subjects to die for it; nor would any commoner, whatever their apparent ability, be elevated to the rank of an officer. In France, however, these new practices were all in line with the general rationalization of the state, society, and economy that took place under the Republican (1789–1799) and then Imperial (1800–1814) governments. The ancient power and privileges of local elites, institutions, the church, the guilds: all were to give way to the central authority. The result was the French astride the continent, at least for a time: until many of the things that had made it successful were adopted by its rivals. However, because of the destruction or destabilization of established orders by the victorious French armies as they swept across Europe, these tools proved difficult for existing elites to control. In central Europe and in Italy, in particular, new nationalisms had taken root that would prove impossible to permanently suppress.

   The creation of something that transcended or overrode local, familial, or confessional ties was a watershed moment in European and world history; so much so that when asked about the impact of the French Revolution, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, speaking in 1972, is said to have replied: "Too early to say." Indeed, though after their initial defeat of Napoleon the triumphant conservative coalition tried to turn back

the clock at the Congress of Vienna (1814), these hopes were quickly dashed. Too much had changed in France for the French nation to suffer the return of a non-constitutional monarch and noble privilege. The Bourbon Restoration (1814–1830) was subsequently ended after a tumultuous decade and a half; and when the cousin of the ousted King Charles, the Duc d' Orleans Louis Phillipe, assumed the French throne following the July Revolution (1830) he did so as "King of the French" rather than "King of France," as had his predecessors. "France" was no longer a piece of territory: it was a people. Further, his support from the armed streets of Paris came only after a pledge to introduce a constitution, circumscribing his own authority and empowering the people to have a say in their governance. His reluctance to ultimately follow through on this pledge resulted in his ouster during the continent-wide Revolutions of 1848, which only London avoided, arguably because of the concessions it had made to democratic forces the decade prior (Collingham and Alexander 1988).

This is the critical point. For Marx's "Springtime of Peoples" had its origins in the dual revolutions that had taken place during the late eighteenth century, but which really only began to reshape European society in fundamental ways during the 19th. It was the efforts of the various monarchical governments to enjoy the benefits of industrialization and bureaucratic rationalization, which increased their own states' capacities, without bowing to any of the political demands of the increasingly urbanized, literate, nationalist, and mobilized masses which, along with an untimely string of bad harvests, led to the eruption of de Tocqueville's forewarned volcano. Apart from the irregular mass movements of people in Europe during the period, brought about first by war and then by famine, the very process of industrialization was disrupting the old patterns of local relations as peasants were increasingly uprooted, moving to cities, and thereafter coming to know themselves by their close encounter with those different from themselves. In an age borne of Enlightenment Rationalism, defined by apparent human progress, of increasing mastery over the forces of nature, of the destruction of ancient (irrational) orders, the only justifiable rule came to be seen as that which was by or for "the people." While this did not necessarily mean representative democracy, it did require a basic attention to public opinion by

rulers and efforts to shape it; hence the proliferation of public schools that served to inculcate a patriotic society. During a period that saw the destruction of virtually all the relations that had previously given meaning to the life of an individual, the family, community, church, guild, et cetera, the construct of the nation-state could fill this void.

Of course, as already illustrated above, the question quickly became which peoples were to gain that pinnacle of national expression: their own state. Here, like so much that took place during the period, the interests of the Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) must be clearly understood to make sense of events. For example, Napoleon III was willing to back Cavour's play to unify Italy in order to weaken Austria, which subsequently lost its remaining Italian possessions (1859). Following the upheavals of 1848, which had hit polyglot Austria Habsburg particularly hard, Vienna was increasingly forced to share power with Budapest, culminating in the elevation of the kingdom and formation of the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy (1867). The immediate catalyst for this undesirable, but probably eventually inevitable, capitulation by Vienna to the Hungarian gentry was the defeat of Austria by Prussia (1866) in the second of Bismarck's three "lightening wars" contrived to create the desired "little Germany." That is, Prussia deliberately fought in order to exclude German-speaking Austria from what would shortly thereafter become a united Germany, following the successful conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War (1870), in order that it, Prussia, would dominate the new state. Plagued by internal revolt and beset by structural decline, the disintegration of the centuries-long Ottoman presence in the Balkans precipitated multiple crises (1908, 1914), wars (1877, 1912, 1913), and resulted in the creation of several new states (Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia) over which Austria-Hungary and Tsarist Russia contended for influence. Here, the expansiveness of Serbia's integralist national claims proved especially troublesome given the actually existing multiculturism of region; while the historically based claims of others, like Bulgaria, butted up against the claims of their "new" neighbors. Determined to suppress Polish nationalism, the powers which had divided it, Russia, Prussia, and Austria (1795) included in the final agreement a provision stipulating that none of the participants would ever include any reference to "Poland" in any

of their official records or titles. Lastly, the Irish, effectively suppressed by the British numerous times (1848, 1867, 1916), and receiving German help, eventually succeeded in the creation of a free Irish state (1919), though this would hardly settle matters.

As evidenced above, though the period between the defeat of Napoleon and the outbreak of the First World War is generally described as a period of relative peace, war and intervention was a virtual constant on the Continent. Further, from Greece (1821) and Spain (1823) to Italy (1861) and Bulgaria (1878) the national question was often at core of these conflicts. In addition, it was regular for powers with perceived interests to intervene. Such practices were to prove increasingly dangerous as nationalism became a pillar of state power, and wars moved forever beyond the small set-piece battles of the eighteenth century variety. While not yet zero sum contests, or "total wars," the Crimean War (1853), American Civil War (1861), Franco-Prussian War (1871) and Russo-Japanese War (1904) had given a strong indication of what was to come. Nationalism seemed uniformly preferable to Europe's ruling elites than did the other mass movements of the day, the various sects of revolutionary socialism and communism: which sought not just a reorganization of the political order, but the social and economic orders as well. The vast population and resource needs of industrialized war increasingly demanded concessions to democracy, however limited as in the case of Prussia; but it was quickly discovered these demands could be deflected by militarist forays in places far away. Nationalism, therefore, went from being something to be suppressed or contained by established heads of government, to something formulated, nurtured, and channeled.

Nationalism and the Road to War

It was in the late nineteenth century that these changes all began manifesting themselves in a basic transformation in the internal and external expressions of nationality and nationalism within and between states. The move from nationalism being something of the left-revolutionary universalist movements of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth

centuries, be they liberal or republican, to the increasingly state nationalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, while varied and complex, is easy enough to comprehend when viewed in its proper historical context. On the one hand, reeling from several decades of changes in the social fabric of the lives of Europeans, from the advance of the natural sciences that undermined religious faith to the great migratory waves induced by famine and war, to the basic process of industrialization that saw peasants leave the land and crowd into cities as factory workers, it was natural that the individual sought membership in some new group, some new set of social relations that gave their lives an apparently greater purpose; while on the other, the democratization of societies, the breaking down of old hierarchies, as well as the increasingly rigorous geopolitical competition between European states, particularly over territories abroad, meant that the ruling classes of the various European states sought, to varying degrees dependent upon their specific circumstances, to harness the power of nationalism, both to solidify their own rule and to increase the capacity of their states for power projection purposes.

This change is clearly evidenced etymologically, by the subtle alterations in what existing words signified, as well as by the introduction of entirely new words such as "nationalism," which did not really begin appearing until the late nineteenth century, and which was initially only applied to the ideologies of certain right-wing groups that sought to use national feeling to purify the state as well as expand its territorial holdings. The word, however, quickly came to supplant the clumsier existing phrase "the principle of nationalities," which throughout the nineteenth century had served to designate the question of peoples, nations, and their relations to states, already existing or hypothetical. Its emphasis on the oneness of a nation and its rights and prerogatives joined seamlessly with the existing trends, economic, political, and social, which had opened up space for the creation of Anderson's imagined communities that would replace the old organic bonds of community, ties to the land, and to a local idiom. Hence, at the same time the proliferation of print media, mass literacy, and the standardization of national mythologies, whatever their origins, and their inculcation in the population by the two great institutions of nationalism, the mandatory public school and

conscripted period in the army, existing words took on new connotations. For example, the Spanish "*patria"* changed from meaning the place where a person was born to being synonymous with the Spanish state; while in Italian, "*paese*," which again had long referred simply to the village of one's birth, again came to be closely associated with the nation, and in particular the state (Hobsbawm 1987, 148).

So it was that the initially secretive revolutionary groups who carried the nationalist flame through much of the early nineteenth century, and who saw the struggle for national recognition as (usually) a universalist one, at least as being applicable to all Europeans, saw their cause adopted by ruling elites set to harnessing the power of the industrialized nation under arms in order to better compete against their European rivals in the by then heated competition for overseas territories. For the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the apogee of imperial competition, of the division of Africa (1884), of repeated crises abroad that threatened a war between two or more of the Great Powers, as at Fashoda (1898), at Agadir (1905 and 1911), and in the Balkans (principally in 1908 and 1912). It was also a period of tremendous transitional friction, as emerging powers confronted a status quo not to their liking and sought to change it (Mearsheimer 2001). In particular, the creation of Germany through a series of strategic wars and clever diplomacy (1871) disturbed the concert of powers that had, with the exception of the war in Crimea (1853), kept the general peace in Europe since the Congress of Vienna. Once the bulk of the former German Confederation had been unified under Prussia the German state was immediately the most powerful in Europe, and its eventual attempts to float a commensurate navy so alarmed the British as to prompt it to join with the French and Russians to box Germany in. At a time when competition abroad was increasingly seen as zero-sum, nationalism made the horse-trading foreign policy practices of the old Europe impossible. Indeed, though it is too much to attribute the outbreak of World War One to nationalism alone, it played an inextricable part in bringing to an end the long nineteenth century and the widespread belief in the increasing enlightenment and progress of the human species that had come to be taken for granted. Suffice it to say that by 1914 each European state was noticeably teetering under the strain of trying to accommodate the various

forces contending, sometimes, violently, for control over both questions of national identity and the distribution of wealth within their societies. Ultimately, maintaining both the existing social orders within each state as well as the balance of power between them proved to be too much, and Europe's various heads of state chose war.

The "Great War" and Its Consequences

While an archaeology of the causes and consequences of the so-called Great War, which killed some 20 million people, wounded some 20 million more, created 2 million refugees, and resulted in the destruction of multiple governments is beyond the scope of this chapter, several points are worth noting as they further illuminate the subjects under discussion. For while the facts of a rising Germany, increasingly rigid alliance blocs, and the necessities of mobilization schedules all contributed to the outbreak of a war none of them had wanted, it was ultimately a question of peoples which provided the catalyst. For when the Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip struck a blow for the (South)-Slavs by killing the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, he created a serious problem. Given assurances by Berlin that its move against Serbia would have Germany's backing, the Austrian government knew doing so risked a response from Russia, which had embraced as part of its national identity the role of protector of all Slavic peoples. For its part, though Saint Petersburgh could hardly afford a war, indeed the monumental efforts required ultimately led to the collapse of the Tsarist regime, a fate it had barely escaped a decade prior (1905), for domestic political reasons Russian leadership could not be seen backing down. Weakened by its defeat at the hands of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War (1904), the government of Nicholas II had then been forced, during the Bosnian Crisis (1908), to stand aside while the perceived rights of their fellow Slavs were trampled by Vienna, and had faced serious criticism from conservative, liberal, and popular elements within Russia and elsewhere as fellow Slavs were annexed by Austria-Hungary. So it was that the most autocratic of European States, Russia, was so sensitive to public outcry over yet another apparently humiliating climbdown, a blow to

the Russian nation, not simply the Tsar personally, that it risked war. And the war came, precisely as the unifier of the German state, Bismarck, had presciently foreseen: over a complication in the Balkans arising over the competing interests of a weakening Austria and Russia with the receding of Ottoman power.

So it was that a period of intense competition within and between European nation-states as they forged and fought over distant empires and peripheral slices of their neighbors' territories ultimately resulted in a total war of the initially eager and mobilized masses. Those on the left who had believed that workers the world over would reject involvement were disappointed, while still others among the labor and socialist parties embraced the war as an opportunity; as one wrote, "How will anyone be able to doubt we love the fatherland when so many of us will have been decorated for bravery?" (Emmerich 1975). All but a few, in short, flocked to the colors. Conscripted and subjected to organized campaigns of propaganda, then a modern invention, any who protested the war publicly were arrested. This was true even in the United States, which, as Bismarck had also foreseen, eventually entered the war decisively on the side of the British. Having played the pivotal role, Wilson brought with him to Versailles a vision of Europe that rejected the Habsburgian principle of national autonomy within states or empires in favor of one that embraced a highly democratic version of the national state. Hence, the Baltic states were created, as were the contradictory Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia from the remains of the polyglot Austro-Hungarian Empire. Further, a Polish state, out of existence since the late eighteenth century was resurrected, while the borders of Romania and Bulgaria saw territorial adjustments that, in the final analysis, did not conform to the apparent principle of the ethnolinguistic nation-state any more than did the artificial Czechoslovak or Yugoslav states, neither of which exist today. Pointedly, however, contrary to his declarations Wilson's Fourteen Points were not to apply to the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which like the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires now found itself at the mercy of the victors of the "war to end all wars."

Much like the eventual treaty produced at Versailles, the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) that formed the basis for the division of the Ottoman Empire's territories between the British and French at war's end was to

sow the seeds of much future conflict. The frankly superficial and self-serving efforts of the King-Crane Commission aside (1919), created at Wilson's behest in order to try to ascertain the desires of those peoples in the Middle East, the division of the former Ottoman Empire's holdings in the Middle East by the French and British by the drawing of crude lines on a map was to create the ethnic and sectarian differences that still plague the region to this day (Ehrlich 2016). While those differences between the peoples of the region, which had no history of states as such, were ignored when they were not actively exploited in the ancient Roman strategy of "divide and rule," the secret agreement, along with the Balfour Declaration (1917), alienated existing allies in two ways. First, by denying the Arab peoples generally of the right to self-rule it gave rise to anti-western sentiment in one of the only regions of the global south that previously had little or no (recent) reason for animus against it. Second, this betrayal of its wartime Hashemite allies in the Arabian Peninsula was compounded by the British commitment to a Jewish state in Palestine, itself a wartime expedient, and an idea which was (almost from the first) resisted even by those Arabs favorably inclined to the European powers for having helped to throw off the Ottoman, that is to say Turkic, yoke. Zionism was, however, in many ways the perfect embodiment of the ethno-linguistic state theory of nationalism that took hold in the later nineteenth century. Indeed, prior to the 1880s and the invention of the vernacular, that is to say non-religious, Hebrew language there was no association between these admittedly ancient peoples and any concept of a homogenous people tied to a specific geographical area as such. A combination of historical memory, outright invention, land purchases, and political pressure by way of lobbying, and guerilla, even terrorist, tactics, Zionism was in many ways a forerunner to the efforts at nation building in southeast Asia and Africa during the period of decolonization that followed the Second World War.

The Failures of the Inter-War Period

Decolonization would have to wait, however; for though the two great imperial powers of the nineteenth century, Great Britain and France, had been permanently weakened by the First World War, demographically and economically, as well as socially and ideologically, insomuch as the mythology of glorious war would never again stir the masses to eagerly take up arms against the perceived enemies of their nation-states, they were more or less able to reassert control over their exogenous possessions, as well as their new "mandates," the euphemistic term adopted following Versailles for what were in fact new colonies in the Middle East. Apart from the reassertion of Western colonialism, and the creation of a highly unstable Europe of revanchist powers and new states of dubious legitimacy in the eyes of some of their neighbors, or by groups within the states themselves, arguably the most important thing to come out of the negotiations following the end of the First World War was the retrenchment of the United States. Its entry into the war had been decisive militarily and economically; without it, Germany almost certainly would have won; and so at Versailles it commanded the strongest negotiating position of the three victors. The post-war framework, however, was to be rendered practically impotent by Wilson's inability to gain the necessary domestic approval for his vision, most specifically the ill-fated League of Nations, which represented an attempt at dramatically reimagining relations between states. Much like the split between neoconservatives and neoliberals during the post-Cold War period, Wilson and his chief Congressional opponent, the American Imperialist Henry Cabot Lodge, were at loggerheads over approach rather than principle. On one side were those like Wilson and later Clinton, who believed that the best way for the United States to maintain its interests and influence in the far reaches of the globe was through multilateral institutional frameworks, and those such as Lodge or the younger Bush, who tended to see such institutions as impediments to U.S. freedom of maneuver.

Apart from the League's inability to prevent Japan and Italy from engaging in campaigns of territorial expansion in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and then Germany's later in the same decade following the Nazi's

seizure of power (1933), the League had been unable even to prevent Weimar Germany violating the terms of the Treaty at Versailles, which it had begun doing with surreptitious assistance from the persona non grata U.S.S.R. under the guise of the Treaty of Rapallo (1921). This has in large part been shown to have been a coordination problem, where differing interests and assessments made effective joint action impossible (Mulder 2022). As the strongest of the participating powers, Great Britain's leadership in enforcing violations of the Treaties was looked for, but while this was the period of the British Empire's greatest territorial extent, its sheer size could not compensate for its increasing economic difficulties. The war had run the government deeply into debt and cuts to the military were absolutely necessary, hence the Washington Naval Conference (1922), where Great Britain accepted naval parity with the United States. The agreement was an acknowledgement that the current was moving away from Great Britain despite its part as victor in the "Great War." This was the moment of the so-called "Kindleberger Trap," the moment when the existing global hegemon ceased to possess the sufficient strength to enforce the existing global order, and to underpin its financial system, but the rising and more capable power, in this case the United States, was unwilling to stop "free riding."

Besides the politicking of Henry Cabot Lodge from his position as the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the same realities of democratic politics constrained the liberal internationalists in the United States in the same way they prevented a small wing of hawkish British Conservatives, such as Winston Churchill, from taking power and confronting Germany prior to 1938 (Bouverie 2019). And while the United States had lost over a hundred thousand men killed in just over a year of fighting, Great Britain had taken nearly a million casualties during the four years of total war, and its democratic politics were defined by a public mood that was against any possible road that might lead them to another Somme or Passchendaele, particularly in upholding a peace by that time widely accepted to have been too harsh and authored by the French. So it was that the German state rearmed and sought to change the status quo in Europe without serious initial resistance. By the time Neville Chamberlain issued his unlooked for war guarantee to Poland, Berlin had already remilitarized the Rhineland, annexed the Sudetenland,

and incorporated Austria. In short, the attempt to move in some ways above and beyond the nation-state system (wrongly) seen to have precipitated the First World War had failed for want of mutual consensus, states strong enough to defend themselves from their neighbors, and a power, or coalition of powers, strong enough and willing to act to uphold the existing order in the face of a challenge to its status quo. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the crumbling empires of the former European heavyweights would finally be dropped or wrenched away by determined nationalist movements that globalized the nation-state, while in central and eastern Europe the blanket of Soviet Communism was thrown over the question of nationalities and the territorial autonomy of the state—at least for a time.

The Globalization of the Nation-State

Much like the French Revolution, Decolonization was the manifestation of several longer term trends that once built up, and especially when sufficient disruption to the existing order opened up space, erupted. That these expressions differed spatiotemporally, temperamentally, ideologically, and in the ultimate outcomes they produced is hardly surprising given the differing circumstances and relations of each, both within the subjugated territories themselves and between metropole and colony. For example, while Great Britain had already by the outbreak of the First World War seen plenty of problems in the white settler colonies, whose agitations presaged the eventual creation of a looser, less coercive relationship within the Commonwealth (1939). It also saw serious trouble in Ireland, culminating in independence for the Catholic lower half (1922), and in India, where after the war it was grasped by more than a few that the granting of self-rule before it was bloodily taken was both desirable and necessary. The Portuguese, by contrast, fought and held on to their few west African and east Asian colonies until the 1970s. In this they were unlike the French, who gave up fighting losing and domestically unpopular colonial wars in what are now Vietnam (1954) and Algeria (1962). And while it is true that the process of Decolonization continued well into the later part of the twentieth century, indeed is still

in many places ongoing, the World Wars marked significant moments in this process. On the one hand, as already seen the war had weakened the European states in fundamental ways; they were economically enfeebled, demographically drained, and psychologically shocked; while at the same time the very idea of colonialism, which had come under severe criticism by both the United States and the U.S.S.R., had become something ideologically, if not materially, different than before the war. Imperialist competition over territory and influence had played a significant role in the outbreak of the First World War. After the war, the principles underlying the new Europe of sovereign and independent nation-states clashed sharply with the realities of the colonialism they practiced, and would in many cases provide the template for the protests for equal treatment in the colonies among the native elite, usually educated in their respective imperial metropoles, where they were immersed in the discourse of rights and exposed to the social innovations of vanguard political parties, civil society organizations, and coordinated mass campaigns (Hobsbawm 1994).

A look at the changing cartographical landscape over the period 1900–1965 is illustrative of the disruptive impact of World War on European colonialism, and by extension on decolonization and independence: the birth of a new nation-state. Prior to the First World War there had been only 78 internationally recognized polities; by 1965 there would be well over 100, a new addition approximately every three years, with dozens more to come over the following decade as, in particular, the multitudinous Caribbean islands were to undergo the process. As a fact, practically the entirety of this numerical change occurred after the Second World War; for while the First World War, though it vitally weakened Europe's hold over its empires, and in many cases, such as in Egypt and India, led directly to important reformulations of the relationship between metropole and colonial elite in a way favorable to the colonized, it ultimately led to the creation of no new independent nation-states anywhere outside Europe. Of those new states that were created during the inter-war period, for example, out of the old Ottoman territories, such as Iraq and Syria, these were hard pressed into subservience by their international protectors, Britain and France, once oil was discovered in the 1920s. As was the case elsewhere, these new states were riven

with divisions, religious and ethnic. All too often, fanning these divisive boundaries proved a useful and necessary tool for maintaining control by the outnumbered colonizers. In India, for example, when the Indian National Congress refused to assist in the war effort without a grant of independence, the British responded by stoking fear of Hindu domination among the sizeable Muslim population, which through the Muslim League supported the war; and after, when independence came (1947), so too did partition, with the creation of specifically Muslim Pakistan (1947). The ethno-religious dimensions of the violence that accompanied it, a million died while nearly 20 million were displaced, were a preview of forces that, though they would be sometimes suppressed by the Cold War, would come more to the fore in the years that followed. In the case of Islamic fundamentalism, primarily because of Saudi and U.S. support (Horton 2021).

Indeed, apart from the later mujahadeen in Afghanistan, the nationalist movements of the Cold War were defined by a simplified, though not exclusive, politics of left and right: that is to say some variation of Marxist-Leninism and secular nationalism, which often expressed itself in the form of a military dictatorship. The antecedents to the conflict were already visible at the end of the Second World War, where on the Asian mainland the right-wing Kuomintang regime of nominally Republican China rearmed Japanese POWs in order to beat back the rival Chinese Communists (Westad 2017). Later, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian leftist revolutionaries frequently collaborated in each other's local struggles against various conservative dictatorships aligned with the United States. With its emphasis on the party, state planning, and subsequent transformation of previously backward Russia into an industrialized power of sufficient strength to defeat the Nazis, the Soviet Union offered a direct and apparently impressive alternative to the hitherto dominant variations on liberal capitalist nationalism that had formed the basis of virtually all such successful nationalist movements of the pre-World War I era. Further, Moscow could and did offer material aid, technical assistance, and geopolitical backing. And so for the moment that was the Cold War (1947–1989) the struggle for global influence between the United States and the Soviet Union often resulted in the fledgling nationalist movements of Asia and Africa, as well as the

revolutionary and reactionary governments of Latin America choosing to align with, or being pressured to align with, one or the other. Again, this alignment usually, but not exclusively, adhered to the basic left–right dichotomy, though exceptions, such as the Sino-Soviet split or Tito's earlier break with Stalin, hinted that even at the height of seemingly monolithic power bloc confrontation considerations of a state's interests were of greater importance than any ideological considerations (see also, Castro's initial attempts to have his regime recognized by Washington).

New nation-states of the developing world were faced with answering the two basic political questions: "who are we?" and "who gets what?" In some cases, history provided the basis of the former, as in Vietnam; while in others, such as Pakistan, a new polity was imagined whole cloth. In virtually every case, to describe the thing in question was an inherently exclusionary act, which at its most extreme expressed itself in campaigns of ethnic cleansing. Even when this outcome was avoided, existing divisions regularly led to efforts by ethnic or religious groups to capture the state for themselves. Hence the well-known African aphorism "it's our turn to eat." Across Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia, having often used minority collaborators to rule a suborned majority, the general superstructure of the societies in question generally did not change, in that it was still basically extractive rather than developmental, with new exploitative and repressive elites replacing the old. Neocolonial relationships, often between strongmen and foreign multinationals, were especially prevalent in cases where immense natural resources were to be found. By themselves, extensive academic literature suggests these often have the perverse effect of hindering broader social, economic, and political development (Murshed 2018). Even in the best of cases, balancing the rights of the minority with the will of the majority is a delicate task. As the example of Myanmar and Ukraine have shown, even transitioning to democracy does not automatically ensure the rights of minorities within the state will be protected. This requires internal agreement, and cannot, as has been shown by repeated failed interventions by outside powers, be uniformly and permanently imposed.

The "Unipolar Moment" and Beyond

In response to the historical conflicts over natural resources, territorial boundaries, and the rights of national minorities, which had plunged the world twice in as many generations into full-scale industrial slaughter, Washington in the wake of the Second World War had prescribed the increasingly free movement of goods and peoples and the creation and maintenance of international bodies to enforce agreed upon rules and to arbitrate disputes among members. Thanks to the reduction of capital controls, tariffs, import quotas, export bans, and laws against foreign ownership, as well as advances in long-distance shipping, logistics, and communications the world became increasingly integrated into a single global market. This framework, which was gradually evolved and drew on several previous similarly minded attempts at supra-national, or inter-state cooperation, saw the United States lead the Western bloc through the end of the Cold War (1988) and breakup of the Soviet Union (1991). In many ways, the post-Cold War order that followed stemmed from Washington attempting to further globalize its existing policies and established institutions. It was thought, especially after the conclusion of the Cold War, that the "end of history" had been reached, that the world would be one of liberal capitalist democracies that deferred to Washington on matters of global security—those at its most radical edge arguing that states and nations were increasingly unimportant because of globalized capitalism's erasure of borders, the commodification of life, and the atomization of the individual.

Despite some initial successes, Washington utilizing institutions from the U.N. and World Bank to the IMF and GATT to craft joint trade frameworks and conduct apparently successful economic and military interventions, a combination of miscalculations and negative parallel developments soured many, domestically and abroad, on U.S.-led globalization and prompted former rivals to begin actively resisting their incorporation and transformation. For one thing, it quickly became clear under the Clinton and then George W. Bush administrations that there was one state whose power and centrality would not be displaced in the new world order: its own. Apart from the expansion of its military alliances and assets unsettling Russian and Chinese leadership, successive

U.S. governments did much during the period following the end of the Cold War to dim the allure of its vaunted political and economic system behaving in such an unrestrained way. The U.S. unilaterally intervened in multiple countries without U.N. support or Congressional authorization, lied about their justifications for doing so, and in the case of the War on Terror created a secret network of black site prisons abroad where it subjected those it kidnapped to torture. Domestically, in the wake of 9/11, itself blowback from Washington's prior interventions in the Middle East, the U.S. government created a vast new domestic security state that was quickly revealed to be spying on its citizens—as well as on key allies, such as Angela Merkel. Increasingly, U.S. policies and politics came to be synonymous with debt, death, distrust, and dysfunction. Indeed, at a time when increasing numbers of states, including those that have been relatively successful democracies, are turning away from liberal constitutional orders, the view of American democracy abroad has scarcely been lower. U.S. governing elites attempting to prosecute those states which refused to conform to its vision of world order seriously damaged U.S. credibility at the same time their deliberate policy of deindustrialization alienated those domestic constituencies whose communities were affected. That George H. W. Bush's announced "new world order" was an elitist, technocratic pursuit and not a popular one is evidenced by the fact that every winner of the White House from 1992 to 2016 was the candidate who on the campaign trail had promised to do less internationally, both militarily and in terms of multilateral trade deals. To focus on the domestic, on the local, was clearly the desire of those who felt increasingly powerless in a flattened world.

In Europe, too, pushback against the European Union's project of marginalizing the local by removing from its individual member states many of their prerogatives, powers and responsibilities came from those who saw in the bloc not limitless economic possibilities in the global marketplace, but rather the centralization of decision making power into the hands of an even more distant and inaccessible state authority. The early results of the Union were such that the majority of voters in enough member states rejected serious efforts at further constitutionalizing political integration—and this was before economic disaster struck. The Eurozone Debt Crisis, like the Global Financial Crisis in the United

States, and in particular the handling of both by their technocratic and political elite, resulted in a populist backlash of both the right left and right—from the socialist Podemos in Spain to the fascist Golden Dawn in Greece, to Brexit and the National Front, to Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party in the United States (Tooze 2018). In both cases, it should be noted, migration crises spawned by another series of unnecessary and ill-considered military interventions, this time in Libya and Syria, added fuel to the fire. In both cases, these forces eventually broke through: in the United Kingdom with Brexit and in the United States with the election of Donald Trump. Both were expressions of voters' rejection of the prior generations' integrationist programs. Particularly in the United States, Donald Trump succeeded in shifting several long standing consensuses. His championing of protectionism policies and confrontation with China eventually led to both Republicans and Democrats following suit.

The last period of deglobalization occurred during the interwar years of the 1930s. These were roundly terrible for all involved, and indeed the slump left virtually no part of the world poorer than it had previously, or would otherwise have, been. The same would be true now. In fact, there is every reason to believe a significant amount of the urbanization that has occurred over the past fifty years will quickly become unsustainable (Zeihan 2022). Few states are naturally self-sufficient, able by themselves to feed or fuel their populations, let alone capable of producing advanced manufacturing products like semi-conductors. Ever-increasing globalization meant location largely didn't matter. Whatever was needed could be gotten at the absolute lowest price on the global market and shipped at low cost and low risk immediately. As U.S. elites continue to aggressively pursue a new policy of containment vis a vis China and Russia, the possible disruptions and carry on effects in world energy and material goods markets are impossible to predict. As of this writing, however, sanctions continue to pile up, tariffs continue to be raised, and subsidies dispensed. As in the first Cold War, a significant portion of the developing world has clearly signaled it does not want to choose sides in a second round of bloc confrontation. As before, they stand to lose the most. So, too, not insignificant numbers of Europeans have voiced their discontent over U.S.-led policy toward Russia; the feeling is likewise in South Korea vis a vis China and now nuclear North Korea. Standing on

the literal front lines of any potential battle, they understandably desire more cooperation than confrontation.

Clearly, for all their failings, many of the major projects undertaken by the collective West over the past several decades were decidedly liberal efforts in the direction of a de facto interstate federalism (Christensen 2021; Hayek 2022). At their best they sought to eliminate barriers to the flow of capital, goods, and people through voluntary participation in collective negotiation. These increased global economic output significantly, raising billions out of poverty, and bringing hitherto scarcely conceivable luxuries within the affordable reach of virtually every consumer. That these policies and institutions have come under attack from illiberal forces on both the right and left is not surprising. What is surprising is just how ineffectually and spiritlessly particularly the former were defended. As Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2013, 2019) have noted, narrow is the corridor of liberty and prosperity. Political discipline is not a noted characteristic of democratic governments, and poverty and fear are the eternal enemy of constitutional government. Removing these dangers to liberty and prosperity by promoting economic growth and harmonious relations between states should be the goal of all who share some vision of a world more closely intertwined. While entirely different social, economic, and political forms of organization are easy enough to imagine, in practice the structural resilience of the state and the still clearly potent ideological force of nationalism weigh against any radical reimagining. States, nations, and nationalism being inherently collectivist one could reasonably argue they are thereby antithetical to individual liberty. This need not be the case, however. As shared human constructs, they can be put towards whatever purposes their users can agree. In terms of organizing complex human society the minimal state can be thought of as necessary and morally justifiable, as Nozick (1974) argued—though not without vociferous disagreement from fellow libertarians (Rothbard 1977). Further, a sense of pride at the values of one's own nation need not translate into hostility toward those of others. Additionally, economic growth is not zero sum. Indeed, the case for economic growth through further openness is convincing (Brennan and van der Vossen 2018). While there are practical impediments to other states voluntarily placing themselves

under the Constitution, support for such a path is far more promising than the alternatives of deglobalization, fragmentation, and confrontation. As the pendulum of American history swings, the possibility of a return to the "United States" more plural than singular, with the executive reigned in, would do much to accommodate the particularist, decentralizing ethos of the current moment, and to help resist the siren call of militarist nationalism under the aegis of an overpowering centralized authority, which is and has everywhere been the enemy of liberty, property, peace, and prosperity.

Conclusion

For over a century, the United States has been the single most powerful nation-state in existence, and its collective decisions during that time have had world-changing impacts. Considering its continuing position of relative preponderance and entrenched advantages, this will likely remain the case for the foreseeable future though the relative balance of power has shifted considerably in certain areas since the end of the Cold War. The changes in this relative balance of power have reliably produced wars in the past. Of course, arguably one of the central impediments facing further integration of the libertarian interstate federalist tradition is the very fact of geopolitical conflict. It was a fact that informed the framing and adoption of the Constitution (Klarman 2016). As evidenced above, the United States has prevented (most) conflict among its member states and close allies, in large part by opening its own markets to the domestic production of its partners in order to gain the cooperation of its political elites on matters of global security. As also seen, however, this has proven problematic when it comes to dealing with states uncomfortable with U.S. military hegemony or economic domination, principally Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. In fact, Washington's efforts have prompted the active resistance of its preferred policies in several cases by these states alone or in combination, causing Washington to respond in turn. This escalatory cycle has seen various elements of Washington's global system turned increasingly coercive. While the system has always been somewhat inherently coercive to the extent that regimes Washinton

did not like were excluded and thereby made much poorer, and the unluckiest subjected to a U.S. military invasion or covert action, recent policy directions have no precedent going back decades. Not since Washington sought to curb the rise of the Japanese Empire as a threat to its own future domination of the region by cutting the islands off from the raw materials critical to its industrial economy has Washington moved as aggressively as it is now moving to cut off Beijing's access to the critical materials of the digital economy: the most advanced semiconductors and the tools to make them, while banning or sanctioning Chinese firms in other industries of the future, telecommunications, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence. The moment is fraught with danger. The libertarian realist perspective can illuminate much that stands in the way of realizing a path towards peace through decentralization, however, and by so doing encourage further efforts toward voluntarist engagement between states in accordance with the interstate federalist tradition.

While there has always existed a complex tension between expansionists and their opponents, any honest examination of the history of the United States must be read as a chronicle of the (almost) unmitigated triumph of the former over the latter. "Almost" because Canada and Cuba exist as independent entities, the former not recognized by the United States until 1927, and then only after multiple invasions (1775, 1812, and 1837), the latter still the subject of crippling embargo and virtual isolation as punishment for escaping virtual U.S. control in 1959. On the whole, however, expansionists got what they wanted. Hence, the history of the United States is one of almost permanent war. Since, as Rothbard noted, citing Randolph Bourne, "War is the health of the State," little wonder the state grew apace with Washington's appetite, and its need to project force increased in proportion. Even the relatively mild exertions of the losing effort of 1812 convinced the ardently opposed Jefferson Hamilton had been right about the need for a central bank and domestic manufacturing base (Howe 2007). The majority of the wars that followed, however, featured largely irregular warfare and required only occasional exertion on the part of Washington. Disputes with rival claimants such as Great Britain in the northwest and Mexico in the southwest were quickly settled, the first by the threat of war the second by

successfully waging it on a budget against a chaotic Mexican state. Meanwhile the slow and steady extermination or internment of the native population continued apace in the background as Washington consolidated its grip on the Pacific coast. Further afield, contrary to the popular mythology about "not going abroad in search of monsters to destroy" Washington had already sent a considerable number of missions abroad in the name of furthering its interests. Beginning in north Africa (the Barbary Wars, 1801–05 and 1815), then moving on to China (1856–59, and again in 1899), Japan (1853), Formosa (1867), and Korea (1871), the United States was a constant presence, asserting the equality of its claims along with the other imperialist powers. These claims, like their claim to an exclusive sphere of influence in the western hemisphere (1823), were to remain aspirational rather than actual so long as the constraints of the original Constitution remained in place.

While a full understanding the transformation of a United States in the plural to a United States in the singular requires tracing the state and nation building process, something beyond the scope of this chapter, as Foner (2019) notes it was the equivalent of a "Second Founding" in its reimagining of the relationship between the states and Washington, and of Washington's own implied powers. Further, as Bensel (1991) notes, it laid the groundwork for the expanded bureaucracy necessary for the complex administrative tasks required of a large Modern state. Also, unlike the more or less low-level frontier wars that scarcely touched on the lives of those other than directly involved, what distinguished the Civil War from any that had come before it were the demands it made on its citizenry, the restrictions it placed on their rights, and the powers it seized for itself in the process of waging it. Whatever else it did, the Civil War dramatically increased the powers of the state. The period of rapid industrialization that followed was to increase its powers still further. Afterall, in the era of industrial warfare, industrial output was virtually analogous to military capacity. Its population, too, swollen by years of loose immigration policies toward (particularly western) Europe had exploded. Its power projection capabilities suitably enhanced, Washington contemplate more aggressive action abroad. That the Washington establishment did so at precisely the moment the frontier was declared officially closed, the west declared "settled" 1892, is suggestive. Finding

outlet for the state's expansionist urges, the Spanish-American War (1898) at the same time offered a great collective foe against which to recommit the American nation. The familiar rally around the flag effect, as well as the similar impulse not to "waste a crisis," as documented by Higgs (1987, 2007, 2012), was well demonstrated in America's first real newspaper war, which featured the deliberate manipulation of public opinion and brutal conquest in the Philippines. Progressivism coincided with the apogee of European Imperialism, and in Washington was its partner in fondness for social prescriptions to keep the population docile and productive for leaders to spend their blood and sweat fighting for their own aggrandized visions of state and national glory. It was not until the creation of the Federal Reserve System (1913), passage of the Income Tax Act (1913), conscription act (1917), and creation of a propaganda service (1917) that the new American state was prepared for a lengthy military engagement of industrial proportions that demanded such enormous sacrifices from its citizenry. As soon as it was, however, it immediately plunged in.

While international relations between the Civil War and First World War between Washington and Europe are often neglected, a careful examination of the period reveals an important lesson. Specifically, that it was at this time, the inarguable height of the British Empire's relative power, London abandoned the remotest contingency plans for war with the United States over any future disputes in the Western Hemisphere. Evaluating the relative gains and costs of a hypothetical conflict with the United States over areas where their interests might potentially conflict, the British opted to conserve their power. Washington, bound up in its own much more tangled network of alliances, would be wise to heed the lesson of the eventual decline and fall of the British Empire, which spent itself ultimately over a question of Austrian politics over fear of a theoretical future German threat. As things stand, Washington has sent the unmistakable message it views Beijing as challenging the status-quo and is responding to defend its position rather than yield ground; so, too, the interests within the state which exist and benefit because of these policies being continued are mobilizing. Here, again, libertarian realism is instructive as a subjectivist perspective that views foreign policy as a function of "domestic political considerations." For example, the committee

for NATO expansion was started by Bruce Jackson of Lockheed Martin: either out of strong belief that Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine's inclusion in NATO strengthened U.S. security or because Lockheed Martin wanted to sell more jets; that a well-connected retired U.S. General is writing on behalf of the UAE government because: they believe the UAE is swell or because they're being paid several hundred thousand dollars to lobby on behalf of a regime whose human rights record is on a par with that of Iran. The perverse incentives of the system mean there is a bigger lobby advocating for more nuclear weapons than for fewer, and virtually none at all for peace, which makes no money after all. While it is true armaments manufacturers profit from and actively attempt to stoke public fears and steer public policies in efforts to increase their profits, the majority of business is disrupted by war. Even now, as the governments in Washington and Beijing increasingly lock horns, experts are doubtful whether "decoupling" is even possible (let alone the correct policy pursuit). Regardless of its economic wisdom, trade war and decoupling are attractive both at the elite and interest group level. Public choice theory is clear about the likely consequences of such common democratic choice architecture; in no subject are voters apt to show less competency than foreign policy, though it is precisely through these channels that much of the potential to unlock the oppressive powers of the state and nation through resides. Meanwhile, the rents collected are diffusely paid while the amount each is taxed is low enough to prevent coordinated and sustained opposition developing—given the effective management of the thought climate, citizens may even believe themselves lucky the government has contracted so many extra ships, tanks, and planes, et cetera, so as to handily outnumber any hypothetical enemy or combination of enemies by an order of magnitude.

However, studied consideration of the matter can furnish no believable reason why Washington needs a standing army, let alone one so large. Its geography and the relative weakness of its neighbors are why the United States has traditionally been a naval, and then, air power. Apart from their cost and the threat they pose to liberty, a massive standing army is also like a magnet to the hawks and foreign paymasters who solicit U.S. military intervention on their behalf and in their interest. Initiatives for state governors to take back control of their National Guards

should be supported, as should Congressional initiatives to strip the Presidency of the wide war-making powers it has assumed to itself over the past century. The national security state apparatus, obviously, must go. This will take effort, especially to educate the public, though they are often apathetic or even hostile. Myths of "national defense" and "good wars" aside, it is clear that the path to peace is the devolution of the responsibility for the power to inflict coordinated violence, where power projection capabilities are greatest, down to the local levels, where the danger to liberty broadly is at its most minimal. Done within the context of a reinvigoration of the autonomy of the American state within a more originalist constitutional republic, this would once again make the states, as they were in de Tocqueville's words, laboratories of a lived democracy whose legitimacy was its very authenticity. By contrast, conceived as it originally was by the Prussian aristocrat Bismarck, the military-Keynesian, social-democratic welfare state of today is the logical outcome of what, at least in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, an educated German would not have hesitated to confirm; from Ralph Raico, the worldview of a representative German historian writing about the period: "The old liberalism is dead. The idea of increased state autonomy, the idea of power, has replaced it. It is this idea that inspires and guides leading men everywhere."

Bibliography

Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2013. *Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, New York: Crown Business.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2019. *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, New York: Penguin.

Anderson, Benedict. 2016. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso Publishing.

Bagehot, Walter. 2001. *Physics and Politics: or Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of 'Natural Section' and 'Inheritance' to Political Society*, Ontario: Batoche Books

Bensel, Richard. 1991. *Yankee Leviathan: the Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bouverie, Tim. 2019. *Appeasement: Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the Road to War*, New York: Tim Duggan Books.

Brennan, Jason, and Bas van der Vossen. 2018. *In Defense of Openness: Why Global Freedom is the Humane Solution to Global Poverty*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Chamberlin, Paul. 2018. *The Cold War's Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace*, New York: Harper Collins.

Chomsky, Noam. 1985. *Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace*, Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Christensen, Brandon. 2021. "Reviving the Libertarian Interstate Federalist Tradition: the American Proposal," *the Independent Review*, 26(3): 429–450.

Connor, Walker. 1978. "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a..." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1(4): 379–388.

Collingham, H., and Robert Alexander. 1988. *The July Monarchy a Political History of France, 1830–1848*. London: Longman.

Davies, Norman. 1996. *Europe: A History,* New York: Oxford University Press.

Ehrlich, Reese. 2016. *Inside Syria: the Backstory of their Civil War and what the World can Expect*, Amherst: Prometheus Books.

Emmerich, W. (ed.). 1975. *Proletarische Lebenslaufe* (Reinbek 1975), 11, p. 104.

Foner, Eric. 2019. *The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the Constitution*, New York: Norton.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Gaddis, John. 1989. *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War,* New York: Oxford University Press.

Hayek, Friedrich. 2022. *Essays on Liberalism and the Economy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Higgs, Robert. 1987. *Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government.* California: The Independent Institute.

Higgs, Robert. 2007. *Neither Liberty Nor Safety: Fear, Ideology, and the Growth of Government.* California: The Independent Institute.

Higgs, Robert. 2012. *Delusions of Power: New Explorations of the State, War, and Economy.* California: The Independent Institute.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1962. *The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848.* New York, World Publishing.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1975. *The Age of Capital, 1848–1875*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1983. *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1987. *The Age of Empire*, 1875–1914. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1991. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1994. *The Age of Extremes*, 1914–1991. New York, NY: Vintage Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 2021. *On Nationalism*, London: Little, Brown Book Group

Horton, Scott. 2021. *Enough Already: Time to End the War on Terrorism*, Austin: the Libertarian Institute.

Howe, Daniel. 2007. *What Hath God Wrought? The Transformation of America, 1815–1848*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Kennedy, Paul. 1989. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000*, New York: Vintage Press.

Keyssar, Alexander. 2000. *The Right to Vote: the Contested History of Democracy in the United States*, New York: Basic Books.

Klarman, Michael. 2016. *The Framers' Coup: the Making of the United States Constitution*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Lafrance, Xavier, and Charles Post. 2019. *Case Studies in the Origins of Capitalism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maier, Pauline. 1991. *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Maier, Pauline. 2010. *Ratification: the People Debate the Constitution, 1787–88*, New York: Simon & Schuster.

Mearsheimer, John. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.

Mulder, Nicholas. 2022. *The Economic Weapon: the Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Murshed, Mansoob. 2018. *The Resource Curse*, Newcastle: Agenda Publishing.

Nozick, Robert. 1974. *Anarchy State and Utopia*, New York: Basic Books.

Osiander, Andreas. 2001. "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," *International Organization*, 55(2): 251–287.

Parker, Geoffrey. 1996. *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Payne, Stanley. 2011. *Spain: a Unique History*, Madison: the University of Wisconsin Press.

Raico, Ralph. 2010. *Great Wars and Great Leaders: a Libertarian Rebuttal*. Auburn: Mises Institute

Raico, Ralph. 2012. *The United States at War: World War I*. Oregon: Blackstone.

Renan, Ernest. 2018. *What is a Nation? And Other Political Writings*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Rothbard, Murray. 1977. "Robert Nozick and the Immaculate Conception of the State," *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, 1(1): 45–57.

Scheidel, Walter. 2021. *Escape from Rome: the Failure of Empire and the Road to Prosperity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sharman, Jason. 2019. *Empires of the Weak: the Real Story of European Expansion and the Creation of the New World Order*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Snyder, Jack. 2005. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Tilly, Charles. 1975. *The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 2002. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*, Cambridge: Wiley-Blackwell.

Tooze, Adam. 2018. *Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World*, New York: Viking.

Tuchman, Barbara. 2012. *The Guns of August & The Proud Tower*, New York: the Library of America.

Wedgwood, Cicely. 2005. *The Thirty Years War*, New York: NYRB Classics.

Westad, Odd. 2017. *The Cold War: A World History*, New York: Basic Books.

Zeihan, Peter. 2022. *The End of the World is Just Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization*, New York: Harper Business.