Tragedy, Myth, and Liberty in Interstate Theory

Barry Stocker

Introduction

This chapter does not offer a new liberty-oriented theory of interstate relations. It offers some thoughts about the parameters of any liberty oriented theory, which plays full regard to the tragic aspects of political and social existence in relation to the tragedies of individual human lives. It argues that tensions between states are endemic and always have the potential for violence. Violence can be restrained by an internationalist or cosmopolitan understanding of law. This does not have to mean transnational or global institutions, and these are possibilities rejected by some liberty-oriented thinkers. The perspective of this chapter is that humanity is inevitably divided between political communities and that rationalistic top down homogenising transnational or global institutions are bad for human flourishing. The perspective is also that absolute

B. Stocker (✉)
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: barry.stocker@bogazici.edu.tr

B. Christensen (ed.), *Liberty and Security in an Anarchical World Volume I*, Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-70525-0_1

sovereignty is bad both at the transnational and national levels. A liberty-oriented view is best expressed through multiple sources of sovereignty, which to some degree are coordinated at the transnational level, but to some degree always challenge the coordination in a constantly evolving network of centres of sovereignty. The main purpose of this chapter, then, is to look at the tragic roots of the understanding of individual freedom, conflict and interstate relations, looking at how this evolves over time and is best understood from perspectives which maximise tragic tensions and the energy of individual human activity, seeking the struggles and the laws which best feed on and intensify tensions in creative energy and positive activity.

There is some recent international relations theory drawing on the idea of tragedy in international relations (Brands and Edel 2019; Kaplan 2023), but it is very focused on generalisations about international relations using a very general approach to Greek tragedy, standing in for all literary tragedy and all forms of tragic thought. However, it has been understood, at least since G.W.F. Hegel, that modern tragedy requires a different analysis than ancient Greek tragedy ('Dramatic Poetry' in Hegel 1975) related to general changes in society, which are expressed in social and political thought as well as literary form. The antique republics did not have a modern understanding of liberty, as they were traditionalist pious societies, in which the divine and the identity of the state were closely tied. Ideas of liberty as liberty to follow inner impulses and stand aside from the community, even opposed to it, were not developed in the way they have been in later history, even if we can find some early anticipations. Hegel's understanding of tragedy in this way was itself anticipated by Wilhelm von Humboldt's work of minimal government liberal political thought in *Limits of State Action* (1969), written in the 1790s, that makes relevant distinctions between ideas of liberty and welfare in antiquity and modernity.

What follows historically presents the idea of a first age of tragedy as an age of heroes followed by an age of reason, understood in tragedy, as a traumatic conflict between heroic myth and individual reason, which allows less poetic forms of thought about the state, violence and politics. A discussion of the second age of tragedy in the Renaissance, particularly Shakespeare, looks at this in relation to political thought from

Niccolò Machiavelli to Thomas Hobbes. This is covered relatively briefly as a transition to the third age of tragedy, in which the themes of modern interstate theory, strategic studies, literary aesthetics and theories of liberty really appear in a form that is close to what we have now, from Montesquieu to Kierkegaard via Humboldt and Clausewitz.

In the Beginning: Homer's Time of Heroes

If we consider the origins and history of social science from a literary point of view, or even just take a complete view of the history of social science, International relations and strategic studies theory could be said to have a double beginning in two epics of ancient poetry: *Iliad* and *Aeneid*, which both precede the work of historians that are the most obvious beginning of interstate theories. The Latin *Aeneid* (song of Aeneas) is a sequel to the Greek *Iliad* (song of Ilion [Troy]), which also emulates and transforms Homer's own sequel to the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey* (song of Odysseus). In referring to 'Homer', the name is here taken in a purely pragmatic way without any presuppositions about the authorship of the two 'Homeric' epics, including any presupposition about identical authorship. The main issue here is Homer, but it is important to note that Roman tragedy in Seneca, along with major historical work in Livy on war and the Roman state, follows Virgil, in a pattern resembling the Greek progress through these forms, in a compressed timescale. There may be an indication here of how social and historical theory flows from literary imagination.

The Homeric epics refer to a world largely consisting of small states, which only co-operate, if at all, through loose alliances, though they are not portrayed as fighting each other. This seems like an idealisation of the ancient Greek world in counterpoint to a reality of persistent intra-Greek conflict. The *Iliad* suggests that these Greek kingdoms themselves comprised groups of landowning nobles unified in loyalty to a king, but not integrated into anything like a unified state structure. The latter point is further emphasised in the *Odyssey* by the relations between Odysseus and the 'suitors,' that is members of his nobility who occupy

his palace, and try to force his wife to accept a new husband, during Odysseus' twenty year absence.

The world beyond Greece is portrayed as similar in structure, religion and so on. The background is a war in which Greek kings, before a time when the word for Greece, 'hellas', existed, are besieging a city (which may or may not have something to do with the site now know as Troy) on the Aegean coast of Anatolia, during the Bronze Age, the time of Mycenaean Greece, when the Hittite kings dominated Anatolia and western cities were in a tributary relationship with this Anatolian empire. The Hittite empire is not mentioned and nothing like it appears to exist in the Homeric world, despite the influence of Hittite culture on Homeric epic Homer (Bachvarova 2016). The nearest thing to the Hittite hegemon are brief mentions of Phrygia, which emerged as the strongest state in Anatolia after the Hittite collapse. Homeric poetry assumes a world without a large—scale hegemon or central power, so in some sense inaugurates international relations theory in the mythopoetic sphere with a deep assumption that normal interstate relations are between approximate equals. The Trojans resist the siege of the Greek league for ten years, but this itself rests on having allies, so interstate conflict is placed in a world of interstate alliances, which may even have some hints of political confederation.

Towards the end of *Iliad* Book II, Zeus' messenger Iris tells King Priam of Troy and his son, the hero Hector, that the alliance he commands led by Troy is distinguished from the Greek alliance army by its multilingual nature. Maybe this passage is a reason why Nietzsche emphasises the supposed monolingual nature of the ancient Greeks as assumed by them, divided as it was between hundreds of state, though Nietzsche (On the Utility and Liability of History for Life, Section 10) himself recognised that the idea of a linguistically and culturally self-contained Greece was itself a myth created by the Greeks (Nietzsche 1995, 166–167). It seems the idea of a monolingual Greece emerges in Homer and makes the Homeric epics a gesture of sorts towards panhellenism. Homer's Greek world is assumed to have more of a unified essence and harmony between Greek states than ever obtained in reality.

The *Iliad* does not report a real world of international relations but creates its own world with 'real world' elements. It is no less a model of

interstate relations, mixing ideas of how they should exist and how they do exist, and how they might fail. While war is regarded as inevitable in the Homeric epics, there is no less of a sense of its horror and the benefits of avoiding it. At the most obvious level, interstate relations fail in the Homeric world because a Trojan prince abuses hospitality by stealing Helen, the wife of his host, the King of Sparta. War begins then when rulers fail to follow the basic traditional and divinely ordained codes of Bronze Age princes. Given that, it is clear in Homeric poetry that victory in war and the plunder of resources is central to kingship, there is an obvious tension between two axes of the code of princes, which leads us into the sphere of tragic tensions.

The dream of a peaceful world is not absent in the Homeric epic, and can be seen in the Phaeacians of the *Odyssey* (Books VII and VIII), a peaceful sea trading people in an isolated protective geography. Even within the structure of the *Odyssey*, they are like a mythical force to be encountered and left behind in the journey home, even if not to be conquered, endured, abandoned, destroyed or evaded like the more malevolent mythical forces. It is suggested they are on the edge of a disaster due to the jealousy of the gods, so peace is an inherently unstable idea. The Phaeacians bring Odysseus home, so it is fitting that they are less threatening than other mythologised places.

In the *Iliad*, the suffering and destructive passion of war is explored intensively. The Greek army outside Troy is initially afflicted by plague sent by Apollo, because Agamemnon has enslaved the daughter of a priest of Apollo. Agamemnon will only agree to return her to her father if Achilles agrees to compensate Agamemnon with Achilles' favourite slave girl. These brutal transactions exist themselves in contrast to the happy love between Hector and his wife Andromache along with the more tormented love between Paris and Helen. The world of Homeric poetry is also defined by these tragic tensions and conflicts.

In the *Iliad*, two likeable characters, who have more to them than blood, lust, and greed, Patroclus and Hector die. Hector's body is defiled by Achilles, whose rage is stated as the main concern of the poem in its opening. Achilles does in the end find some fellow feeling with Hector's father Priam and hands over Hector's body for respectful burial, but the funeral is itself an implicit act of mourning for the coming fall of Troy

and the destruction of its people. The *Odyssey* is more an epic of homecoming and joyful reunion of the family. Nevertheless, the reunion is embedded in extreme acts of violent rage. Odysseus lost all his soldiers and followers on the long journey home. His father died and his son grew up while he was away for two decades. His loyal dog died in sad circumstances after his return. The end can be taken as the return to home life, which takes Odysseus above the agonies of separation, wandering and violence. The happiness of homecoming is part of a contrast with the external world of war and wandering.

However, the violence and the loss of at-homeness itself characterises Ithaca in its take over by the suitors, Odysseus' disguised return, the violence against the suitors and Penelope's doubt about the identity of Odysseus. The confusion and violence of the external world is present in Ithaca, and Odysseus' wanderings are not over. He has one more long journey to make to expiate his offence against Poseidon, and then peace is promised in which his life will be ended by death from the sea (*Odyssey* Book 24). The disturbing element of the sea, scene of his wanderings and controlled by his enemy Poseidon, will always be there. He marked the sea and mapped it out in some way in his long journey and encounters with its supernatural dangers. The journey is a mythologised story of encounters with the external world, the world beyond Ithaca, which makes it a mythologised work of international relations, or a mythical forerunner of international relations theory as reason concerned with the threat of external violence from rival states. What is mythologised is the violence that lies beyond the laws of the homeland, particularly at sea which presents the horror of a death not commemorated by burial, and the threat of pirates unrestrained by a familiar ruler.

There is a history of taking Homer as the source of political thought. The most obvious example, is Aristotle's suggestion in Book I of *The Politics* (1.2 1252b22–23) that the Cyclops (*Odyssey* Book 9) represent a kind of pre-political human existence, the opposite of a proper polis in the isolation of the cyclops from each other. In the case of Aristotle, pre-political means a-social and the two run together. Aristotle's suggestion can lead us to see the earliest simplest human existence, as one of isolated family units in some kind of loose community defined by sharing a god, as a divine ancestor. There is little solidarity in this

very loose community and outsiders to this community are treated with extreme violence. Violence of a particularly horrifying kind, expressed in devouring the companions of Odysseus, reducing them to the status of non-human animals which are farmed or hunted. This foreshadows the fate of Odysseus' men when they fall under the power of Circe (*Odyssey* Book 10), suggesting another way in which humans become subjected to a kind of law of violence, rather than violence restraining law when they leave their homeland.

The *Iliad* has the poetics of a world of war between states, of war as a normal state of affairs defining relations between states. The *Odyssey* is not concerned with declared war between states, it deals with a constant violence of encounters with strangers and mythopoetic forces which encode deep external and inner dangers. The encounter with the cyclops become more dangerous because Odysseus gives way to his longing for fame and shouts his name at Polyphemus as he sails away from the island, after hiding his identity under the name of 'no-man' (*Odyssey* Book 9). This name itself brings up a great existential anxiety, the anxiety of not being known, of being such a complete outsider that no one knows who you are. It also raises the general issue of status in international relations, the desire for superiority and recognition of superiority, which leads to conflict and possible disaster, as Thucydides explores in The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians (2013).

The dangers and violent conflicts that Odysseus endures in the mythical space of a voyage far from home, reflection on, come from, and intensify the modes through which he rules his own kingdom. The hostile relations with outsiders is tied up with fear and violence towards those he rules. It is Odysseus who beats up the insubordinate soldier, Thersites, who speaks rudely to his superiors in the *Iliad* (Book 2). It is the anxiety and the desire of Odysseus who is known for his tricks, his disguises, his lack of a truthful self. He lies to the Phaeacians (*Odyssey*, Books 7 and 8) who rescue him on the last stage of his ten year journey home. He lies to the people of Ithaca when he gets home and uses deception to lure the suitors into a deadly trap that arises from his disguise (Books 14–24). He is associated with the deception of the Trojans by the wooden horse. He can only be himself in the middle of the army of the Greek alliance or his family home in Ithaca. To some degree he can be at

home with his companions on the voyage home, but he is separate from them, as dramatised in the Sirens episode (*Odyssey*, Book 12) when he alone is able to hear the song of the Sirens, which is itself an expression of his desire for fame and fear of its consequences.

There is even some parallel with the the Laestrygones of the *Odyssey* Book 10 and the Cyclops in Achilles' cannibalistic threats against Hector as he gets ready to kill Hector (*Iliad* XXII). The desire to leave Hector's body unburied on the battlefield to be devoured by the wild animals is accompanied by the urge to devour his flesh himself. This is tied to revenge for Hector's killing of Achilles' friend Patroclus. The interstate conflict is particularly personalised at this point. Achilles' rage serves no calculation of state interest, just a very personalised urge for inner compensation. This very personalised approach does come from an ethical world in which honour, revenge and friendship dominate the motivations of aristocratic warriors. That is the background to the *Iliad* in which Paris broke the expectations of guest-friendship by stealing Menelaus' wife Helen from him, during a visit to Sparta.

The main lesson in this context is that personalised honour considerations dominate in war and interstate relations. Within the *Iliad* itself, Achilles' rage is the dominant theme, first in relation to a fight over a concubine and then the death in battle of his best friend. The war itself is replicated in the funeral games that are part of the mourning of Patroclus (*Iliad*, Book 23). A raw competitiveness and complaints about interventions of the gods, create a kind of world of heroic war in miniature. Intertwined issues of warrior prowess and closeness to the gods prevail.

This is all tragedy in that it is all concerned with some innateness of conflict and tension to social order and the violence, death and disaster which necessarily follow. Since there is always competition, there will always be the breach of guest-friendship, conflict over the possession of women and an excess of anger. The context of the *Iliad* is reasonable anger in that Menelaus, and his allies, have a right to seek revenge for the abduction or seduction of Helen, according to the standards of the time, but that anger contains an excess beyond the forced return of Helen in the destruction of Troy which takes place after the ending of the *Iliad*, but is foreshadowed within the poem. On this basis it can be said that interstate relations are based on the excess of revenge and anger,

which comes from the breach of agreements. These moments of excess are inevitable because the agreements just restrain a deep competitiveness comprising passions of envy, revenge and anger. In this case, limitless war seems like a real danger, foreshadowing one of the third age of tragedy, the possibility of complete annihilation in war.

The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* both end in peace. Achilles is reconciled with the Trojan King Priam sufficiently to end the defilement of the corpse of Hector and allow his burial. The funeral ceremony ends the *Iliad* and itself is full of foreboding for the end of the Trojans, so that peace and the fear of annihilation are both intensely present. There is an emergent tragic sensibility here. The *Odyssey* ends with Odysseus reconciliation with his wife Penelope, a renewal of his bond with his land and his pass, followed by the imminent need to make a journey to pacify Poseidon and end the enmity of the god for the hero. This will guarantee Odysseus a long and peaceful life to be ended by death from the sea. The hope for peace and the inevitability of death come together in a total picture that is tragic since nothing can prevent death. Tragic tensions culminate in death and in total destruction beyond the more individualised nature of tragedy when the tragedies properly speaking, that is the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, are performed.

The First Age of Tragedy

The polycentric nature of the Greek world, along with a sense of rival civilisations at its edges particularly suits the formation of a view of human liberty contained in various forms of diversity and conflict. At the centre of the History of the Peloponnesian War is the conflict of rival state forms and social ideals between Sparta and Athens, along with the story of power, rivalry, suspicion, prestige, and military leadership. The Greek world was not entirely dispersed between power points. It was unified by language, religion and culture. There were common institutions even if they did not have governmental power. The most important common institutions are the Sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi and the Olympic Games. The sanctuary was a religious institution, but its role as a source of apparently prophetic knowledge brought people of

power and influence from round the Greek world who acted according to prophecies clearly informed by the political knowledge and opinion of the priest. The league of Greek princes in the *Iliad*, under the leadership of Agamemnon of Argos, is itself a form of confederation in the mythopoetic beginnings of Greek history. From Homer to Thucydides we have an understanding of rivals and shifting hegemons within a loosely confederated Greek world, which serves as a model now for understanding rivalry and changing leadership in a tragic world.

The original classic of interstate theory, as a treatise rather than a literary work, could be taken, and often is, as The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians (also known as The Peloponnesian War). Thucydides can only be understood through what the Attic tragedies and the Homeric epics explore (Bedford and Workman 2001), in political terms the nature of the law of nations, alliances, war, forms of state, and conflicts within states. Thucydides carries on from Homer a focus on conflict between alliances of modestly sized states, rather than referring to a nearby hegemon: the Hittites for Homer, the Persians for Thucydides. This selection introduces a norm for interstate relations which is to prefer a world of competing moderately states rather than a hegemon surrounded by satellites and dependencies, holding down neighbouring powers, which could be regarded as very realistic for a large part of human history including situations known to Homer and Thucydides.

The recognition of the necessary contingency and tension within the state itself and the relations between states is necessarily tragic, and much better perceived in interstate relations in a world of roughly equal states in conflict than with the sphere of influence of a major hegemon, or even in peripheral conflicts at the edge of spheres. The Homeric world does not resolve conflict in cosmic divine order or the peace of a sacral kingship representing divine law. These things exist in Homer, but in constant tensions arising from conflict, violence, rule breaking, and the inherent uncertainty of existence. The tragedies largely deal with the mythical world that structures Homer, containing a history of the Greeks of a kind, before the democratic and oligarchic polities of the classical period. However, Aeschylus' Persians does give an example of a tragedy directly rooted in a history experienced by the author, with regard to participation in the war against Persia, and by much of his audience. In

one perspective we can can see the form of the tragedy of the Persians, the defeat of the proud and ambitious Persian land based monarchy when it fails to subdue Greece, as a model for Thucydides in his account of the fall of Athens, a maritime empire at the hands of Sparta, a land based power, in his history.

Aeschylus' Persians refers to the Battle of Salamis (480 BCE) between an alliance of Greek states and the Persian Empire, a naval battle off the south coast of Attica The Persian Emperor at the time of the Battle of Salamis was Xerxes I, also known as Xerxes the Great. He appears in the play, as does his wife and the ghost of his father Darius. The other characters are a Persian herald and a chorus made up of elite guards of the Great King. These are the only characters, which means there are no Greek characters. A very large part of the audience when the play was first performed (472 BCE) would have been at the battle so they were watching characters from the other side in war, where they had recently lost friends and family. The Persians are not portrayed as evil enemies and they are really portrayed as more Greek than Persian, that is a projection of concerns internal to the Greek world.

The play refers to the dangers of excessive ambition in war and conquest in terms which could apply to the Greek states and use the moral language of Greek culture and philosophy, which emphasises the dangers of excess, going beyond limits, in contrast to the virtues of moderation and self-control, strongly emphasised by Plato and Aristotle. Excessive ambition disturbs the gods, makes them jealous and disturbs the balance of human societies. What Aeschylus brings into the play on the topic of excess, or hubris could apply to the wars between Greek states, and it seems very likely that the play was understood as such at the time.

Further connections can be found between the Attic tragedies and Thucydides. Sophocles' Oedipus the King, is not a historical play in the sense of the Persians, referring as it does to the mythopoetic story of a Theban king outside any historical records. It is, however, widely accepted that Oedipus the King refers to Pericles, the leader of the Athenians in the early part of the war Thucydides records, particularly as the plague Oedipus brings to Athens may be inspired by the plague

which afflicted Athens early in the war. Though there is some disagreement, it is certainly a well established connection in modern scholarship ('Sophocles' Oedipus: In the Image of Pericles' in Tracy 2009; Ahrensdorf 2018). The world of conflict between Greek states, between political systems of oligarchy and democracy, the deaths of many, the failure of grand plans, the fall of individuals, as well as the fall of Athens from the peak of its power all have a tragic dimension which shapes Thucydides' understanding of history.

Thucydides applies the tragic pattern of good fortune which enters into misrecognition and reversal of fortune, as expounded by Aristotle's account of tragedy in the Poetics (Sections 6–18), in his account of Athens, as a victim of its own hubris in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) when it was defeated by Sparta. A few decades after that, it could be said the Spartans became victims of their own hubris when they were defeated by the Thebans at the Battle of Leuctra (371 BCE), destroying their claim to be the strongest power in Greece, and to control lands inhabited by the helot population, just as the Peloponnesian war destroyed Athens claims to dominate Greece. All the Greek city states were subjected to centuries of Macedonian hegemony as a result of the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE with Philip II. The leading Greek states of that moment, Athens and Thebes, which led the Greek alliance, could be said to fall due to hubris, and for the second time in the case of Athens. All the states placed under Macedonian hegemony could be said to have fallen to the hubris in which they failed to unify properly against the emergent hegemon.

Thucydides follows patterns of historical events and tragic form in his account and as he refers to the permanence of the human tendencies he describes (22/4 in standard pagination; 2013, 15), he could be said to have foreseen further events of Greek hubris, as part of a general human hubris in conflict between states. Aeschylus' play itself presents the Persians as completely defeated and in collapse, which is an exaggeration, but is like an accidental prophecy of later events, as when in 334 BCE, Alexander the Great attacked the Persian Empire in Anatolia and succeeded in occupying the whole empire, from Libya to Afghanistan. The defeat of the Persian invasions of Greece in the previous century, as experienced by Aeschylus, may have been the first step towards this.

In the play, news of the defeat at Salamis reaches the Queen, wife of Xerxes. Xerxes appears and then his father rises from the dead (line 681). The idea of the dead communicating with the living to find out about events after their death goes back to Homer's *Odyssey* (Book 11), where Odysseus descends into Hades. The play is a series of lamentations on the defeat of the Persians, which probably tells us something about a part of the origin of tragedy, in funeral orations and ritualised speeches of lamentation. The lamentation includes a strong sense that the Persians have offended the gods, as happens to tragic heroes who cross some boundary established by divine law.

The focus of this in Aeschylus is Xerxes taking his army across the Bosphorus on a pontoon bridge. This offends the god of the sea, Poseidon, known as Neptune to the Romans (lines 721–752). The dangers of offending Poseidon echoes the *Odyssey*. Odysseus' journey home from the Trojan war takes 10 years because he offends Poseidon (*Odyssey* Book 9), who creates many delays and a series of disasters which kill all of Odysseus' companions. The offence to Poseidon in The Persians is the starting point for a divine punishment, which leads to the defeat of the Persians and the loss of an army with soldiers from across the Empire. The Persians are shown to be victims of the uncertainties of chance, along with the nets of fate and necessity. The Persians cannot conquer chance or necessity, the underlying negative forces in Greek tragedy. The universe is tragic both because we cannot escape the necessity it imposes on us and because we cannot predict the consequences of chance. Chance and necessity seem opposed, but interact in a tragic human world (Nussbaum 2001; Williams 1993).

The opposition between Persian and Greek forms of government is also a theme in The Persians.

The Persians refer to the glory of their king as something that is undermined by the liberty of the Greeks (line 243). The Greeks saw liberty as something belonging to Greeks who freely decide laws, while laws are imposed by despotic personal power in the Persian world. There was also a tradition of seeing at least some Persian kings as benevolent rulers, though who made laws and governed with regard to justice and the public welfare. This can be seen in Xenophon's Cyropaedia, which takes Cyrus the Great as a model of good kingship, while Cyrus appears

in Persians as a great ruler from the past. We can see then, as in the political writings of Plato and Aristotle, a tension between the ideal of a polity ruled by laws or philosophy with some kind of collective decision making, and a king who embodies some sense of sacral wisdom and benevolence. The latter possibility is made more an ideal than a plausible reality in Plato and Aristotle, but its force as an ideal is significant. This can be seen in Sophocles' versions of the Oedipus story in Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus and Antigone.

Oedipus at Colonus follows on chronologically from the story of Oedipus the King, provides an example in Sophocles, and is explored first here as a tragedy which takes us into the heart of the genre as it relates to political, state and military tensions of the era. Colonus is the village outside Athens were Sophocles was born. Athens does not appear in Oedipus the King, but Oedipus at Colonus is located at a place which is part of Athenian territory and gives a positive role to the King of Athens, Theseus was a major figure in Greek mythology, who was given the role of founder of Athenian democracy in the collective Athenian imagination during the democratic period. Thebes was the greatest power amongst the Greek city states after Athens and Sparta. In the time of Sophocles and before, it was a rival of Athens. It sided with the Persians against Athens and Sparta during the Persian Wars. It sided with Sparta against Athens during the Peloponnesian War. Nevertheless, Sophocles does not portray Thebes as an enemy of Athens. However, he does portray it as the opposite to Athens in terms of justice and stability, that is he portrays Athens as stable and just while he portrays Thebes as divided and unjust, so we get a picture of the difference between the harmonious ideal just city and the city which displays all the tensions underlying the dream of a just polity. Creon himself recognises that Athens is a centre of justice in Oedipus at Colonus (line 947), in referring refers to the role of the Areopagus. That is the aristocratic law court which is given a mythical origin story in Aeschylus' tragedy The Eumenides.

Oedipus, the fallen King of Thebes, goes to the territories of Athens to find justice and a connection with the gods. Colonus is referred to as a place of the furies or Eumenides (good ones), that is the divine forces which enforce the laws of the gods, and themselves are rather ambiguous between a kind of terrifying demonism and human upholders of justice

(lines 38–45). This ambiguity is a major theme of Aeschylus' Eumenides. Colonus is also referred to in association with the god Poseidon (line 54) and the god Dionysus (line 679), so the sea, sea travellers and earthquakes in relation to Poseidon; mysteries, intoxication, death and rebirth in relation to Dionysus. They exist in opposition respectively to Zeus, king of the gods in the sky and Apollo, god of justice, prophetic knowledge, and light. The play also mentions the Titan (pre-Olympian god) Prometheus (lines 55–57), who rebelled against the Olympian gods on behalf of humanity. This is an example of tragic conflict within ancient Greek myth and religion, as it contains forces which cannot be brought into harmony, which always conflict.

Oedipus is shown in old age accompanied by his daughter Antigone. He has been wandering for many years in the wilderness, in exile, close to starvation and death, so exploring the pace at the margins of community, which is a journey in ethical as well as spatial confusion. Only Antigone has kept him alive. He has now lost the guilt he felt when he first discovered the suicide of Jocasta in Oedipus the King. He says he did not intend to murder his father and marry his mother. These acts were the result of the interventions of the gods, so they cannot be a matter for individual guilt. This shift from an ethics of guilt through pollution to an ethics of guilt through inner intention is a key aspect of the tragic tensions of this era. Oedipus is still treated as accursed in all the places he goes through, seen as polluted and lacking in a way to compensate for his apparent crime. His crime cannot be absorbed by the community, but he comes to question the sacrificial status (Girard 1977, Chapter Three 'Oedipus and the Surrogate Victim') which has been used to define the space in which he exists, and is also known as pharmakos, the sacred figure who has to be expelled to maintain the purity of the community ('Ambiguity and Reversal: On the Enigmatic Structure of Oedipus Rex' in Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1988). This archaic sacrificial role has been identified as the sacral origin of the democratic Athenian practice of ostracism, the expulsion of a citizen so strong the people believe he is dangerous (Vernant and Vidal-Naquet), so again we see how tragedy stands in the crisis of the transition from mythical-sacral social understanding to rational-political understanding.

The other daughter, Ismeme, comes into the play later, preferring exile to staying in Thebes. Creon, the brother of Jocasta, forbids both daughters of Sophocles from leaving Thebes and associating with the exiled king Oedipus. A son of Oedipus, Polyneices, who is in a civil war with his younger brother, Eteocles, seized power in Thebes. This was against an agreement that the kingship would not descend through the line of Oedipus, because it is cursed. That is Creon should be king. Oedipus' unintentionally incestuous marriage to his mother Jocasta has produced a crisis of inheritance. Legal traditional monarchy, as opposed to tyrannical seizure of power rests on principles of inheritance. Oedipus himself is at the boundary of king and tyrant, which is why the Greek title of Oedipus the King is Oedipus Tyrannos. Oedipus was welcome as ruler in Thebes because he vanquished the monstrous divine force at the limits of the city, the sphinx, a counterpart for Oedipus himself, not through inheritance. Some force of inheritance is added to his power when he marries Jocasta, the widow of the recently deceased king, Laius.

What Oedipus and the Thebans do not know is that Oedipus is the heir of Laius and Jocasta, but that family continuity has been catastrophically undermined through parricide and incestuous marriage. This concern with the possibility of incest and parricide as part of inheritance have some antecedents in the stories of the Greek gods. It may also reflect Greek beliefs about incestuous marriage in the Egyptian and Persian monarchy. The reliability of these beliefs is highly contentious (Frandsen 2009), but the important point in this context is that interest in monarchy and incest reflects anxiety about the institution of hereditary monarchy, as based on a family network which can turn into itself, crossing sacred boundaries, existing as more tied to its ancestors than the public good, and scrambling its own hereditary principles. Antigone's attachment to the memory of her father and her brother Polyneices, her willingness to go to the family tomb if she is executed by Creon in insisting on honouring the corpse of her 'traitor' brother, can be seen as heroic but is associated in the tragedy as a preference for the dead over the living, for giving everything to a family scarred by incest, in which all relations are scrambled. The possibility of the royal line passing through children or through the brother becomes catastrophically combined in

the story of Oedipus, and leaves the monarchy to Creon, the brother-in-law of Laius, making a rather weak hereditary claim in a patriarchal society. Oedipus' fear that Creon regards the monarchy as rightfully his, delays his recognition of the catastrophic story of his origins. We can see this as in some degree a justification of politea, a state in which power is shared rather than belonging to an individual ruling by hereditary right. This sense of anxiety, ambiguity and catastrophe in Sophocles, regarding single rulers, reflects the political turmoil and innovative political writing of the time spills over into interstate relations in Oedipus' journey to Colonus and Polyneices' attack on Thebes from a base in Argos.

Creon appears directly in Antigone and Oedipus at Colonus, as the ruler who exercises power with a legal basis, recognisable in democratic Athens, but who abuses it in issuing decrees which oppose familial, traditional, and divine law. In the view of Aristotle and others, the decrees of a tyrant and a of a democratic assembly were bothy undermining of properly formed law from tradition (Politics 4.1292), so the depiction of Creon can be taken to apply both to a personal tyranny and to what we would now call the 'tyranny of the majority.'

Theseus, as a just counterpart of Creon, commands hospitality and protection for Oedipus and his daughters. So when he finds that Creon has taken Antigone and Iseme, he sends cavalry to track down Creon and take back the daughters. Theseus' welcome to Oedipus overrides the initial hostility of the chorus which is angered to see Oedipus in sacred places on the border of Athenian territory. The location of sacred places on the border is itself a mythologised recognition of interstate relations. Familiar law resides on one side of the border. The other side of the border is a hostile force which is not governed by familiar law and contains a point of transition between legal domains. This point of transition where no human law applies is where the gods and mythical forces are most present. In simple terms the border is threatening and fearful, containing elemental conflicts and uncertainties, which are readily mythologised.

The ambiguities of this border zone are expressed in Oedipus' role which evolves from blind broken down wanderer intruding on the border to someone bearing a divine gift for Athens and then dying in such a way as to suggest he has joined the gods. He tells Theseus a secret which will

enable him to avoid conquest by Thebes and maintain a great future for Athens. So the border is where elemental help cones to the community from the outside, as well being the place of elemental dangers. The mythologisation of the border recognises both deep dangers and deeply necessary interaction. Law is only law if it is confirmed by a stranger, a stranger who could be divine, particularly as the border is sacred and mythologised. There is a deep ambiguity about law here. It is both the product of a people deeply rooted in a territory distinguishing them from other peoples in other territories, but also must have some deeper more universal foundation, which for the ancients meant something divine or semi-divine, someone on the limits of experience who could be a god or a monster. There is the mythologised foundation of interstate relations: the assertion of a particular sovereignty against other particular points of sovereignty, seeking legitimacy in the sovereignty of a more universal kind of law and politics. In this case, the particular sovereignty itself may contain or rely on or be disrupted by a monster—god at its heart, tied up with divinity, universality and external forces.

Oedipus prepares a death which no one is allowed to see. He sends his daughters away and after his death they go back to Thebes. Antigone has decided to look after the body of her brother Polyneices if he dies, which becomes the central issue in Antigone. The secrecy around the death of Oedipus connects it with the Eleusinian rites, secret religious practices associated with the god Dionysus, which were deeply embedded in Athenian culture so that a very high proportion of notable Athenians, including the people we still read must have participated. Tragedies were performed at Dionysian festivals, so the mysterious death of Oedipus, which seems to be arranged with the gods, connects the public performance of tragedy with the secret rites of Dionysian worship. Oedipus appears to be restored to the divine knowledge he had when he first entered Thebes in Oedipus the King, saving the city from the Sphinx.

These tragic outcomes of political power, the fall from power, conflicting ideas of hereditary right, the use of violence to settle disputes, conflicting ideas of justice, borders, divine monsters, and other dramas of personalised politics should frame our conceptions of the state, and interstate relations in antiquity, including our reading of Thucydides. In considering the origins of interstate theory, political science and strategic

studies in Thucydides' historical work, we must also consider the context of myth, literature, and philosophy. For Thucydides is a living presence in international relations Homer was the source of the earliest history and understanding of states, while he was living in culture where some of the deepest explorations of power and conflict was in tragic drama.

The ideas of tragedy, state, and liberty arise together in antiquity. They emerge in the tensions between myth and rationalism, sacral power and legalism, as classical antiquity emerges. This is eloquently examined by Foucault in the first two lectures of Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling (2014). His account of the mythical world owes much to the work of his mentor Georges Dumézil and the transition between the two worlds echoes the eighteenth century historical philosophy of Giambattista Vico in the *New Science* (2020), which Foucault certainly read, but does not mention in this context. Another important antecedent for Foucault, and for any understanding of this process is Friedrich Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*, which examines tragedy as part of a transition of this kind.

Tragedy revolves around the experiences of these conflicting forces deep in the human world. The idea of the state emerges when the difference between old sacral monarchies and more recent polities has to be explained. The idea of liberty comes out of the individuation brought about by laws, constitutional politics, and the tragic drama in which the individual is tormented and falls because of tensions between the individual and communal order. This is always a matter of interstate relations. The tragedies come out of the world of Homeric literature in which the idea of individuality starts to emerge in fascination with the hero. The Homeric world begins with a conflict between a league of Greeks states and the city of Troy. Tragedies refer to this and a Greek world divided between many states, but also ordered by the commands and laws of Apollo, focused on his sanctuary at Delphi. The Dionysian festivals at which the tragedies are performed bring whole city communities together in celebration of the god of death and renewal, suffering and intoxication. Tragedy refers to a political and human world of chance, choice and conflict, in which liberty is a necessary if often painful aspect of the conflicts between individuals, within the state, and between states. This is the world of Thucydides in the The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians.

Thucydides provides us with a first 'historical' account in detail of a war over a full book. Herodotus had already presented historical accounts of war, but his Histories have a broader scope than a particular war, even though it does include the earliest surviving accounts of the Persian Wars. Homer gives an account of the Trojan War, but focused on a very limited period within that 10 year war. There are also evident issues of how far we can take it as historical writing. It is a model for historical writing, but evidently reforms history according to the transmission and mixing of oral poetic traditions over centuries. Thucydides signals that he considers it to be broadly historical, which reinforces the case for suggesting the *Iliad* had some impact on Thucydides as a model of historical writing and the narration of a war. The *Iliad* refers to something very germane to Thucydides, which is coalition politics in a time of war. Agamemnon, King of Argos, leads a league of Greek armies in which conflict arises, most obviously between Agamemnon, and Achilles, King of the Myrmidons (in Thessaly). This conflict itself has some foreshadowing of Thucydides's topic, since the Peloponnesian War was broadly speaking a conflict between the Peloponnesus, the southern landmass of Greece, which includes Argos and the north, led by Athens in Attica, between Thessaly and the Peloponnesus. The alliances at the centre of The War between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, are not a straightforward north versus south conflict, but at its core it is a conflict between Attica and the southern and eastern parts of the Peloponnesus controlled by Sparta. The Trojans in the *Iliad* are the centre of a series of alliances, so Homer's war is a conflict between coalitions. These comparisons do not make the Peloponnesian War an exact correspondence with the Trojan War, but they do outline elements of Homer which were a model for Thucydides. Homer was not 'just' a poet for the ancient Greeks but a model for all kinds of knowledge and writing.

In Thucydides' account, the war which pits the Athenian led Delian League against Sparta and its allies, which is also a war between democracies and oligarchies, begins because of fear of a hegemon with increasing power: 'I consider the truest cause, though the one least openly stated, to be this: the Athenians were becoming powerful and inspired fear in the Spartans and so forced them into war' (2013, 16; Book I, 23/5–6). For Thucydides war is where participants encounter unpredictability, the

role of chance, risk and uncertainty. We can say, following Aristotle, that tragedy follows from a failure of judgement and in the context of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, that failures of judgement make us more vulnerable to negative outcomes and a complete fall from a happy life. In this case, we can see the Athenians as making a tragic error when they pursue expanding and intensifying hegemony over fellow Greeks, without regard to the fear this inspires in other Greeks, particularly the Spartans who have the most feared land army of the time.

Think in advance about how unpredictable war can be before you find yourselves involved in one. The longer a war lasts the more likely it is to turn on matters of chance, which we are all equally unable to control and whose outcome is a matter of risk and uncertainty. Men go to war and launch into action as their first rather than what should be their last resort, and only when they come to grief do they turn to discussion (2013, 48; Book I, 78/1–3).

These considerations do not mean that war should always be avoided. Fear of the other side should drive us into war when the fear is justified. While peace should be preferred to war, it is a weakness of judgement leaving us open to the misfortunes of chance, if we always prefer peace. War is a tragedy, but peace is not an exit from tragedy. An excessive attachment to peace leaves us open to tragedy. In this case, Thucydides implicitly assumes a tragic world. War is a tragedy but so is an attachment to peace which leads us to avoid war. The horror of war is an ever present possibility. In recognising this, Thucydides can be seen as closer to a tragic way of thinking than the Athenian philosophers. For Plato, tragedy is inherently immoral and has no place in the education or public culture of the ideal city. At times Aristotle seems to lean towards Plato's desire for a city order of imposed virtue, excluding the more disturbing parts of art, particularly book VIII of *Nicomachean Ethics*. Nevertheless, on the whole he allows for a less perfectly ordered society, which includes a place for tragedy, as discussed in the Poetics, in which tragic performance purges the audience, that is the whole male citizen population of a state, of excesses of fear and pity, in a collective ritual to restore the power of reason over excess passions. From this point of view we could consider Thucydides' history as a kind of written equivalent, which can purge the Athenians of excessive passions regarding the war.

They should not therefore hesitate to choose war in place of peace. It is the mark of prudent men to enjoy the quiet life if they are not being wronged; but when they are, it is the mark of brave men to go from peace to war, and then again at the right opportunity to abandon war for negotiation, neither being carried away by success in war nor allowing their pleasure in peace and quiet to let them be exploited. The person who holds back to protect his pleasures may very quickly, if he stays quiet, be deprived of that very enjoyment of ease which caused him to hold back; while the one who over-reaches himself in the flush of military success has failed to realise how treacherous is the confidence that carries him along. Many a badly conceived enterprise has chanced to succeed because the other side were even worse advised, and even more enterprises that seemed to be well planned have turned out to be shameful failures. No one ever executes in practice just what he confidently pictures in his own mind; we think up our schemes when feeling secure, but then are possessed by fear and fail to realise them in practice. (2013, 70–71; Book I, 120/1–5).

Pericles is the Athenian most respected by Thucydides and it is likely he would have been aware that Sophocles's character Oedipus could be seen as a portrait of Pericles. Even if we do not try to turn the Oedipus character into a portrait of Pericles, the resonances between them are compelling enough to suggest a connection: associations with plague, accusations of being accursed, a drive for knowledge in a rationalism considered dangerous at the time. While Thucydides is largely respectful of Pericles, as someone who offered generally prudent leadership to the Athenians, who was educated and was a man of good character, various hints appear that he regards Pericles as a tragic hero, as someone of good qualities who suffers a reversal of fortune after a misrecognition, and who never had the proper balance of character to offer the most prudent advice. He sees Pericles as a king-like figure, so an anomaly in the democracy, showing the weakness of the Athenian experiment in pure (or very close) unrestrained democracy, which can't sustain itself without a pseudo-monarchic figure with the potential to be a despot. The speeches Thucydides attributes to Pericles are impressive and show an eloquent intelligent man of high principles, but also hint at a man caught up in dreams of unlimited glory and fame for himself and the

Athenians. This is both glorious and dangerous in the epic and tragic consciousness of the Ancient Greeks. The political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle both attempt to limit the possibility of such a leader, as does the constitution of the Athenians. Like Oedipus, Pericles has great virtues of his time but is also deeply dangerous by the standards of his time.

We shall be the wonder of this and of future generations. We need no Homer to sing our praises, nor any poet to gratify us for the moment with lines which may fail the test of history, for we have forced every land and sea to yield to our daring and we have established everywhere lasting memorials of our power for good and ill. (2013, 114; Book II, 41/4) […] To be hated and unpopular in the short term has been the common experience of all those who have presumed to rule over other people than themselves; the wise decision is to accept the odium in pursuit of the larger purpose. For hatred is short-lived, but the brilliance of present deeds shines on to be remembered in everlasting glory (2013, 129; 64/5–6).

Thucydides carries on from Homer in appreciating the role of rage and the desire for fame in human affairs, and carries on from tragedy in appreciating the irreducible role of conflict, misunderstanding, misjudgement and misfortune in the nature of human existence, and all the institutions that emerge on this foundation. Just as Homeric epic had a far greater role in the general culture than modern culture gives to poetry or literary narrative of any kind, classical antiquity, particularly at the time of the writing of the great Attic tragedies, gives a greater role to tragedy than modern culture gives to dramatic writing of any kind. The attitude to epic and tragedy is less that of pure aesthetics, or even pure entertainment, than in later history.

The Second Age of Tragedy

There is a next great step which ties together political thought, interstate theory, military studies and the literature of tragedy. This is the age of Shakespeare in late sixteenth and early seventeenth century London. There appears to be no writing of tragic drama which has survived and

long periods in which none were written, at all, from the first century CE to Shakespeare's time. The nearest thing throughout these centuries were popular performances based on Bible stories, which often survive as texts but the texts have not become major works of literature.

Shakespeare's plays and the general rebirth of tragedy has a historical context, including a context of political theory. Late medieval autonomous city-states in northern Italy had revived the relevance of ancient ideas of polity, as a sharing of power, in a republic. This received full expression in the thought of Machiavelli who also wrote of war, and developed a view of politics as an art in itself distinct from the moral virtues of rulers. The interest in war and in the autonomy of politics goes together as for Machiavelli, it is the strength of the people and the political skill of rulers which leads to victory in war, not aristocratic warriors pursuing a code of chivalry or monarchic glory, paralleling the transition from the hero-aristocrats of Homer to the more organised and broad based military forces of the classical age. War and politics part of the struggle with chance and fate, that forms a tragic consciousness, and which Machiavelli gives particularly strong weight to in the last chapter of The Prince. This is a prelude to the sceptical humanism of Michel de Montaigne, a known influence on Shakespeare who was also certainly aware of 'Machiavellianism' though it is impossible to say whether he also knew Machiavelli as a historian and republican political thinker. Montaigne's scepticism in reaction to ancient Stoicism and modern religious dogmatism, the exploration of self-reflection in Montaigne, Montaigne's elevation of the exploratory essay as a mode of writing, a tradition of high literature in modern vernacular going back to thirteenth century Italy providing an alternative to classical and Biblical models of writing, classical education.

Machiavelli's insights, and the broad historical processes which enable them, allow for the development of political theory that includes claims to a complete system of natural law, with European and global scope, and the beginnings of a contractual understanding of the legitimacy of government. Shakespearean tragedy, in its more political aspects, expresses the tensions; between traditions of sacral kingship, communal justice, and religious customs on one side; the pursuit of power, challenges to monarchy, universalist legalism, and sceptical inquiry on the

other side. The forms of political thought that emerge from the late middle ages and the Renaissance, find expression before, during and shortly after Shakespeare's time in the thought of Francisco de Vitoria, Bartolomé de las Casas, Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Hobbes who was a translator of both Thucydides and Homer, establishing a kind of full circle with the first tragic age. The phrase 'natural law' was first used by political and legal thinkers of the Salamanca School in Spain in the sixteenth century (Pérez-Luño 2013). It labels a tradition that usually claims descent from Aristotle (though the core is certainly already in Plato), in a way that self-undermines. Once natural law is named, its claim to be what justice is turned into just one theory, a theory that can be doubted, rather than an unquestionable ground rock of justice. This is why the naming of natural law and its completion as a legal theory coincides with the rise of humanism and scepticism, along with theories of the autonomy of state, politics and war. This must also mean the tragic culmination and end of natural law in interstate theory, which now varies between fundamental cosmopolitanism in law and a lawless state of nature between states.

The prime place to look for the literary expression of this is in Shakespeare's tragedies have dominated understanding of tragedy as a modern genre ever since the sixteenth century. His tragedies emerge from forces and tensions: which include Protestant versus Catholic religious conflict, overseas discovery and colonialism, Renaissance Humanism,, uncertainties about royal succession in England. This very heterogeneous list gives a sense of how Shakespeare, and his contemporaries were dealing with a loss of old hierarchies, authorities and forms of community. Shakespeare was from a provincial merchant background and himself was a money lender, so was part of the growth of commercial society in this time, a growth which itself promoted early forms of inquiry into political economy. A world of inherited status, wealth from the land, feudal and religious obligation, certainty about the status of monarchies, the supremacy of secular literature by ancient authors along with Biblical writing was eroding. The Bible itself was beginning to circulate in modern translations and not just the Latin translation which had been favoured by the Catholic Church. We should not assume a rapid and absolute transition between different kinds of society, but we

should certainly recognise that there were changes from more medieval assumptions. We can see some rough parallels with the the ways in which Athenian tragedy emerged in a world where piety, sacral authority, tradition and myth were challenged by Sophists, philosophy, the politics of the citizen assembly, the aggressive use of law courts, and overseas trade, along with various new forms of writing and learning.

The Shakespearean moment was accompanied by these innovations in political writing, with Machiavelli slightly earlier than Shakespeare, Bodin in Shakespeare's time and Grotius writing slightly later. Machiavelli breaks with the tradition of books written for princes on virtue as the foundation of royal action, writing on the less virtuous actions of princes and the place of the common people.

Bodin provides another kind of concern with politics separate from virtue and religious principle. Grotius wrote on the foundations of all law, politics and state activity, but particularly referred to law of the sea and International law. With Grotius we can see a new age of international relations and global inter-state law, based on trading and colonial arrangements focused on the sea. He crystallises ways of thinking which are anticipated in some respects by Catholic natural law theory in Spain, particularly in the work of Vitoria and Las Casas. These Salamanca School scholars were concerned with the internal regulation of a cross-Atlantic empire rather than as Grotius was with open seas and open trading in a globe in which the Netherlands had its main colonies much further way than the Americas, in the Dutch East Indies, now known as Indonesia.

Shakespeare's drama, leaving aside strict distinction between tragedies and other categories applied to Shakespeare's plays, refers directly only once to the new globalised and sea oriented world, in The Tempest. However, all his dramas refer to the tensions and changes outlined above. Macbeth and particularly Hamlet stand out as works which bring the unsettled nature of the modern individual to the fore, along with the anxieties with regard to the legitimacy of monarchy, and the reliability of supernatural forces. Macbeth is driven to disaster by the prophecies of witches and Hamlet's fall begins with the ghost of his father, visiting earth from Catholic purgatory. Macbeth shows the state to be itself full of inner enemies and illegal uses of force, so that the interstate conflicts

are found within the state. The crisis of Denmark in Hamlet is resolved by the arrival of an army from Norway. Again inner crises and interstate conflicts fold into each other. The remoteness of God and cosmic moral order is a strong feature of both plays, as is the destructive force of credence in supernatural forces. None of this is to say that Shakespeare was a republican or a sceptic, but that it is important that he recognises their force, as in the idealisation of Brutus in Julius Caesar or despair at divine justice in King Lear: 'As flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods. They kill us for their sport'. If the best form of the state is uncertain, so are interstate relations; if justice is unknowable then so is international or cosmopolitan law, often known then as the law of nations.

The tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides find a kind of political and historical equivalent in a slightly later historical period when Thucydides writes of war, and like the tragedians provides a kind of sequel to Homer. Shakespeare has a kind of literary—historical-political equivalent, a kind of new Thucydides in Machiavelli, who also wrote plays. Though Machiavelli's thought was formed by his experience of diplomacy and military organisation in Florence, his real deep strengths are in writing on the more internal dynamics of civil power. The deep knowledge of history, international relations, military affairs, along with the deep literary sensibility, are really dominated by ideas of political organisation and participation, law and civic struggle. Some similar comments apply to Thucydides' translator and Hobbes. Machiavelli and Hobbes belong to a new tragic age, which carries on from the late sixteenth century into the seventeenth century, covering Calderón de la Barca in Spain, along with Racine and Corneille in France. There is also a tragic sensibility in the political thought which focuses on historically located state institutions detached from natural or divine law.

Natural law is the presumed foundation of civil law, but the sense of a gap is introduced with Machiavelli's emphasis on the autonomy of politics, making it close to war, and with the role of contract theory. The state increasingly appears in political thought as a body with its own identity and actions distinct from what can be fined by law. Juristic thought itself becomes contractualism which opens the space between a world of natural law without legal institutions in the state of nature

and a world of legal institutions outside based on a contract and a political sphere, which are variable and fallible in the application of natural law. Both Machiavelli and Montaigne foreshadow this opening without themselves creating anything like a contract theory. Blaise Pascal creates a kind of Christian tragedy out of the division (Pascal 1995; Derrida 1992), in the era of Grotius and Hobbes. We can place the tragedies of Calderón, Corneille and Racine in this broad context. We can also make a more specific connection between Pascal's Christian philosophy and Racine's tragedy through the influence of Port-Royal Jansenist Catholicism (Goldman 2013). This is a form of Christian thinking which particularly emphasises the absence of God from a fallen world, so in some ways expands on the more humanist scepticism of Machiavelli and Montaigne.

The Third Age of Tragedy

A third tragic arises in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century with the plays of Friedrich Schiller, Johann Wilhelm von Goethe, Friedrich Hölderlin (including his translations) and Georg Büchner. This is also the first great age of reflection on what tragedy is, since Plato and Aristotle, with contributions from David Hume, Hölderlin, G.W.F. Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer and Søren Kierkegaard. This phase culminates in Friedrich Nietzsche's reflections on tragedy and then the Scandinavian tragedies of August Strindberg and Henrik Ibsen. The pivotal event of this third tragic era is the French Revolution, itself drawing on the slightly earlier American Revolution and the seventeenth century English Revolutions. The French Revolution has been seen as a tragedy in various ways, which include: Marx's (1973) famous comment that history repeats itself twice as tragedy then as farce, referring to the wish of French revolutionaries of 1789 to repeat the republicanism of Ancient Rome, and the wish of the 1848 revolutionaries to repeat the 1789 revolution; Foucault's suggested affinities between French medical science of the time, the Revolution and tragedy in *The Birth of the Clinic* (2003); Georg Büchner's tragedy Danton's Death, large parts of which are quotations from political speeches of the time.

The first great work of political thought of that age is Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* (1989), which attempts to turn Machiavelli's rational calculations of interest, force, power and international balance of power, into a broad historical approach to laws, states, and society. Montesquieu provides a major anticipation of, and maybe conscious model, for Clausewitz' great work on violence in interstate relations, *On War* (1976). Before turning properly to Clausewitz though, it is important to note the development of political thought which inform both Clausewitz and the theories of tragedy, and which flow from Montesquieu. Montesquieu himself makes a distinction between moderate government (government under law which allows liberty) in a republic and a monarchy. This in significant degree is a distinction between the republic as a significant form of government in antiquity and monarchy as a significant form of government in the modern world. The republic rests on virtue (patriotism and egalitarianism) in a democracy or moderation (self—restraint) in an aristocracy. In both cases, individual rights are very subordinated to political institutions and communal will. The monarchy rests on honour, referring to the competition for status within a royal court and implicitly incorporating Montesquieu's recognition of the increasing role of status from wealth itself generating a kind of aristocratic honour in a commercial society. The idea of honour in a royally defined status hierarchy spills over into the respectability and status seeking of financiers, merchants and manufacturers. This kind of spill over and various ambiguities in categories are characteristic of Montesquieu, but a clear pattern does emerge as outlined here.

Montesquieu's formulation of a liberty oriented political theory is followed up by Wilhelm von Humboldt and then Benjamin Constant. Both see deep moral and welfare benefits in individual freedom, free interaction between individuals and voluntary association, including freedoms of trade and commercial activity. These views are expressed by Humboldt in The Limits of State Action (1969), written in the 1790s, but not published in full until the 1840s. As Hegel and Humboldt were friends, we can assume that Hegel was fully aware of Humboldt's political ideas and that they had an influence on him. This is not to say that they had the same ideas. Humboldt was certainly more radically individualist and critical of the state than Hegel. There is an obvious

connection between their understandings of antiquity and modernity. For Humboldt, liberty is understood as negative welfare, that is the welfare that comes from the state remaining inactive. This liberty is threatened by positive welfare of different kinds in antiquity and modernity. The positive welfare of the antiques threatens liberty in the deepest way by attempting to form the soul according to communal and state ideas of religion and virtue. The force of this is reduced by the counterforce of the constant struggle of life in antiquity, that is the struggle with nature to have enough to eat and survive along with the constant struggle between human communities in war. This last point, in particular, resonates with the discussion of antiquity above. In the modern world, positive welfare takes the forms of financial assistance to the poor and economic interventionism on the part of a growing bureaucratic state. Antique positive welfare rests on the simplicity of the ancient state in which it was possible to see all human ends unified in one community and its political institutions, while modern positive welfare rests on an increasingly diverse and complex society with an increasingly large state machine trying to control it. I have discussed Humboldt as a classical liberal in relation to Nietzsche (Stocker 2014a), so in terms particularly relevant to this text.

There are related thoughts a few years later in Benjamin Constant's Principles of Politics published in an early version in the late 1790s and published in its full version in 1815 (2003). This includes a chapter on the liberty of the ancients compared with that of the moderns, which argues that for the ancients liberty means liberty from a tyrant or a foreign ruler rather than from political institutions or communal pressure. The ideas of a very individualistic liberty with rights against the state and the community is the product of modern individualism and commercial society. It should be the goal of laws and political institutions to protect and promote modern liberty. Significantly, Constant does make a partial exception for Athens when discussing antiquity. That is the Athens of tragedy and of Homer. Aesthetic theory, including an interest in tragedy was present in both Humboldt and Constant. Humboldt translated Aeschylus' Agamemnon and Constant wrote on tragedy, including the essay 'Reflections on Tragedy' (1971), so we can see that an interest in tragedy and an appreciation of ancient Athens are

important in forming modern ideas of liberty, which also means liberty oriented interstate theories.

Hegel is not part of the pantheon of liberty oriented thinkers for good reasons, but some of the familiar critiques of Hegel go too far in making him a radical enemy of liberty. Space does not allow any discussion of Hegel's political thought here, but his biggest current influence and the most appropriate way of defining his thought is in relation to communitarian political thought, including that of Charles Taylor who partly articulated his political thought through two books on Hegel (1975, 1979) and does not depart from the broad structures and norms of liberal democracy. Hegel's pathbreaking thought on the differences between modern and ancient tragedy, and how to understand Shakespeare within historical and aesthetic categories, does rely on Montesquieu, Humboldt, and Constant. The qualities of Shakespeare's drama discussed above with reference to a more individualistic, legalistic and commercial society can be fully understood after the thought of the three great eighteenth century liberals above, and related thought, has been absorbed. It is Hegel who undertakes this work even if he reacts in a statist, communalist, and collectivist way against Enlightenment liberalism. He does always maintain an understanding that there is value in the liberty of the moderns, a more individualistic liberty in more complex societies. Hegel's thoughts on tragedy and related ethical thought is taken up and transformed by Kierkegaard in a more individualistic way in 'The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama' (in Kierkegaard 1987). There is no space here to expand on this, but I have published a short book on this topic, which can be consulted for an expanded argument (Stocker 2014b).

At this point, we should shift back to interstate theory more strictly defined, in relation to the theory of war and philosophy of violence in Clausewitz, deeply affected by Enlightenment and German Idealist thought. This is in its heart a tragic theory of chance and the difficulties of controlling chance. As he states Chapter One in a famous discussion of the 'trinity':

> War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristic to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies

> always make war a paradoxical trinity—comprised of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy already in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone. These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. (1984, 89)

This belongs with a theory of fate with regard to the tendency of war to become more total and destructive: 'War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes.' (1984, 77). This marks out Clausewitz from more mechanical theories of military organisation as seen in his discussion of Economy of Force.'

The man of action must at times trust in the sensitive instinct of judgement, derived from his native intelligence and developed through reflection, which almost unconsciously hits on the right course. At other times he must simplify understanding to its dominant features, which will serve as rules; and sometimes he must support himself with the crutch of established routine (1984, 213). These perspectives make him a worthy successor to both Thucydides and Machiavelli. His work is often taken simply as a classic of military studies, but it is so much more in its creation of a dynamic complex integrated model of war, with both strongly poetic—imaginative and analytic-systematic aspects. It is a great work of political thought and a broadly tragic study of the role of violence, conflict and uncertainty in human affairs. The conflict and uncertainty is not just in war, but in any attempt at a coherent and

consistent understanding of human action. There is also tragedy in its sense of the tendency of war towards absolute violence and something annihilationist, some deeply destructive in the human condition which conditions interstate conflict.

The tragic dimension of Clausewitz can be more deeply expressed in the comparison of Kant and Clausewitz. In one aspect, Kant hoped for a world of perpetual peace under international law in the universal adoption of political republicanism (1991). A simple contrast between the two great Prussian thinkers breaks down, though, when we consider Kant's tendency to regard war as inevitable and sometimes noble, and Clausewitz' desire for an orderly stable world, and for war to end quickly when it does take place. Kant was anxious about the loss of human activity and highest virtues; there is no war and Clausewitz worried about a disorderly world which could produce a Napoleon bringing near apocalyptic levels of violence across Europe. What we can broadly call Enlightenment sets up a series of tragic thoughts about the relations between abstract ideals and lived reality, the deeply conflicting nature of human interests. In a contrast between Kant and Clausewitz we see two aspects of Enlightenment liberalism entering into deep tensions.

The labelling of Kant as liberal is not controversial, but Clausewitz is not always thought of as such. He is best regarded perhaps as a cautious conservative reformer and anti—revolutionary, roughly in line with Edmund Burke. A lot hangs here on how we define liberalism and classical liberalism, but it is not unusual to define Burke as a conservative—liberal or classical liberal. In the view of the present author a less conservative version of classical liberalism can be constructed via Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft, or in a slightly less radical way than Paine and Wollstonecraft via Constant. If Burke is defined as essentially classical liberal, then Hegel is not as far from classical liberalism as some presume, given Burke's attachment to royal state, traditionalism, existing status hierarchies, and conformity to communal ethics. These are enormous questions which cannot be answered here, but it can at least be stated that if Burke is a classical liberal, or close, so is Clausewitz. Clausewitz had some conservative inclinations, but of a post—Enlightenment kind which allowed for him to be associated with reform movements in

Prussia, and to discern that successful waging of war required a kind of elemental democratic appeal to the people.

The tragedy of international relations in antiquity was the inevitability of conflict, the inevitability of ambition, and the ways in which violence undermines laws. The tragedy of international relations in the Renaissance is that the completion of natural law conflicts with scepticism in thought and with the art of government in practice. The tragedy of international relations in the Enlightenment is that rationally grounded universal norms and projects for perpetual peace conflict with the deep complexity of the social world and its conflicts along with the tendency of war towards competitive Annihilation. As in the previous tragic ages, an increased awareness of the individualistic, self-relational, and deep subjectivity of the human undermines rationalistic hopes, whether in Plato, Grotius, or Kant. Thinkers always emerge immersed in the irreducible nature of violence, contingency, and competing ambition. While advocates of liberty may hope for measures to reduce the chance of war and enforce norms common to a region or even the world, as can be found in Grotius, Kant, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and others, they should beware of both tightly integrated spheres within the globe or an integrated globe. Both projects are liable to instigate their own conflicts and produce new hegemons. Reduction of annihilationist violence through more pluralist and less tightly integrated regimes are more real.

Despite all the richness of sixteenth and seventeenth century exploration of a world which has become more global and less European for European thinkers, with all the tragedies and tragic sensibility, the real modern equivalent of tragedy in antique military, historical and political thought emerges in complete form in the early nineteenth century with the military theories of Carl von Clausewitz. *On War* significantly follows on from the French Revolution and the subsequent Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars across Europe over four decades. The settlement of these wars produces a diplomatic revolution and a revolution in the nature of interstate relations at the Congress of Vienna. The wars and the Congress themselves allow the emergence of the great figure of early nineteenth interstate relations, Klemens von Metternich who does for diplomacy what Napoleon did for war. We can see earlier precedents for

this in Henry IV's project for a Senate of Europe, as a peace-making council, or the Treaty of Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years Wars (though despite popular legend this is in no way the moment at which the modern sovereign nation state was born). The French Revolution produced one kind of universalism, the conservative powers had to pursue another kind of universalism less threatening to existing states and hierarchies, as well as threatening to the peace of Europe, building on earlier efforts to end the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, which also became wars of emerging nation states, by limiting the power of states aspiring to hegemony.

Clausewitz was thrown into this history, in a life which combined the military from the age of twelve, association with the political reforms and struggles (influenced by Humboldt) that followed the defeat of the conservative Prussian monarchy, with broad intellectual interests and associations that included German Idealist philosophy, itself a product of Enlightenment theories of history, society, and knowledge. In the Enlightenment era, Giambattista Vico, Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, and others developed what we can recognise as modern thought about history, the elements of the humanities and the social science as we know them, and in the most general terms an interest in both: complex dynamic integrated systems at the social level; the deep inner nature of subjectivity and the complexity of inner passions.

While Clausewitz is in no way engaged with topics of literary genre, his philosophy of war is tragic in more than one way: it presumes the necessity of violence in interstate relations and the necessity of the intensification of violence where war has begun in order to win as quickly as possible; it presumes that the organisation of war is itself based on the competing necessities of mobilising the people as soldiers, applying the organised will of military leaders, the supreme political power of the government; the impossibility of complete knowledge of the battlefield as uncertainty, multiple points of view and material resistance disrupt any possibility of all-knowing command; the need for a commander as a kind of genius struggling with these impediments to command; the limitless of violence which tends towards absolute violence. We can see literary reflections on Clausewitz in an indirect way, when we think of the role of the frustrated hero who would ideally have been a Napoleonic soldier

in Stendhal, because passion and genius find their expression grand wars under the command of the model military genius Napoleon. We see more direct literary reflections on Clausewitz in Leo Tolstoy's dismissive portrait in *War and Peace*; and in Marcel Proust's connection between a kind of professionalised military romanticism in the French army and the influence of Clausewitz in *A Search for Lost Time*.

Clausewitz is very Prussian-German and focused on land war, but with the full development of his influence we get Anglo-American naval theory in Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett, who are in part applying his influence. Thomas Schelling's influential work on game theory and deterrence has other intellectual roots, but can be seen as fulfilling Clausewitz' comments about rivalry in war and the tendency to greater destruction. We can then bring Clausewitz into contact with Machiavelli and Thucydides in a complete picture of uncertainty, conflict and tragedy in politics, interstate relations and war. With Clausewitz we get a particular emphasis on the tragic possibility of war as annihilation and the genius commander who overwhelms normal political constraints, a Bonaparte or worse.

The greatest political commentary on Clausewitz is by a French liberal, Raymond Aron, who at least leans towards classical liberalism. He establishes the link between Montesquieu and Clausewitz in section of Chapter 9 from volume 1 of the study, the volume concerned with the European age. The chapter includes this passage: The types of war correspond with types of regime. The strategy which suits one contradicts the nature of another. The choice between types does not come from the sovereign will of one or other of the belligerents, and hardly from a common decision of both: it is the politics which carries within it the master lines of hostilities, drawn in advance in the heart of inter and intra-state relations (My translation from Aron. 1976a, 374). In volume two, concerned with the planetary age, Aron comments on chapter VI on the politics or intelligence of the personified state, that: 'Peace, like absolute war, is only an idea of Reason; one reminds us that it is necessary to fear, and the other that we have the right to hope. The first will never become, at the scale of humanity as a whole, the means for realising peace, which is not the absence of war but a force of the soul' (my translation from 1976b, 225). Aron's Clausewitz commentary argues that war

is deeply embedded in politics, so that war is not just the extension of policy in Clausewitz, but the extension of the principles of the political regime. This can be found in struggles within the state as well as between states, so could apply to civil conflicts about the nature of the regime. In this case, the chance and necessity of war, the struggles against them, are part of politics. Since war is so embedded in the nature of politics and social existence, that a period of peace is not the end of war, and that permanent peace is itself a result of deep inner struggles.

The other famous French thinker to produce a book on Clausewitz (though more collected essays than an integrated study) was René Girard (2010) in a book with the French title *Achever Clausewitz* (2011), but sadly Clausewitz is not mentioned in the title of the translation. Girard emphasises the role of mimetic rivalry, the desire to imitate and destroy what we imitate, in war and the apocalyptic tendency of war towards absolute destruction, particularly apparent in the nuclear age, through readings of Clausewitz which opened him up to themes which deeply concerned Girard in his literary, moral, anthropological, and religious interests. In this case, we have gone beyond tragedy or entered into a cosmic tragedy regarding the future of humanity. Tragedy reaches its end in the interstate relations of the nuclear age, and tragic consciousness is necessary to shaping our consciousness of this age.

A liberty-oriented theory of interstate relations must now incorporate awareness of apocalyptic tendencies in nature or war and expand tragedy to incorporate the possibility of a tragedy of tragedies, an absolute violence beyond limited tragedy. What it should continue to build on is the ancient tragic sense of human flourishing resting on rivalry between states which cannot vanquish each other, the early modern sense of the end of natural law or ancient virtues as guides to action, and the Enlightenment sense of interaction between the passions released by war and a cosmopolitanism in law which offers some restraint to rivalry between states in institutions of law. If we are faced with the possibility of secular apocalypse, we must seek the transnational and global laws and institutions which minimise the greatest possible energy without subduing the many different forms of activity and positive use of tensions. The division of the world into strongly distinct spheres or attempts at selecting a power to justly exercise unlimited hegemony, can only defeat themselves

and create new disorders. Alliances between like-minded free peoples are more beneficial to liberty in the world than unilateral primacy of any one state, however strong its traditions of liberty.

Bibliography

Ahrensdorf, Peter J. (2018) '"Tyranny", Enlightenment, and Religion: Sophocles' Sympathetic Critique of Periclean Athens in Oedipus the Tyrant' in *The Oedipus Plays of Sophocles: Philosophical Perspectives*, edited by Paul Woodruff. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aristotle (1984) *The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume II*. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Aron, Raymond (1976a) *Penser la guerre, Clausewitz*. Tome 1. L'âge européen. Paris: Gallimard.

Aron, Raymond (1976b) *Penser la guerre, Clausewitz*. Tome 2 L'âge planétaire. Paris: Gallimard.

Bachvarova, Mary R. (2016) *From Hittite to Homer: The Anatolian Background of Ancient Greek Epic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bedford, David and Thom Workman (2001) 'The Tragic Reading of the Thucydidean Tragedy', *Review of International Studies* 27: 51–67.

Brands, Hal and Charles Edel (2019) *The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Clausewitz, Carl von (1976) *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Peret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Clausewitz, Carl von (1984) *On War*. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Constant, Benjamin (1971) 'Reflections on Tragedy'. Translated by Barry Daniels. *Educational Theatre Journal* 23(3): 317–334.

Constant, Benjamin (2003) *Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments*. Edited by Etienne Hoffmann. Translated by Dennis O'Keeffe. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.

Derrida, Jacques (1992) 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority"' in *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,* edited by Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson. New York, NY: Routledge.

Foucault, Michel (2003) *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*. Translated by A.M. Sheridan. London: Routledge.

Foucault, Michel (2014) *Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Avowal of Truth in Justice*. Edited by Fabienne Brion and Bernard E. Harcourt. Translated by Stephen W. Sawyer.

Frandsen, Paul John (2009) *Incestuous and Close-Kin Marriage in Ancient Egypt and Persia: An Examination of the Evidence*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.

Girard, René (1977) *Violence and the Sacred*. Translated by Patrick Gregory. Baltimore, ML: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Girard, René (2010) *Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre*. Translated by Mary Baker. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press.

Girard, René (2011) *Achever Clausewitz, en Collaboration avec Benoît Chantre* (2nd édition). Paris: Flammarion.

Goldman, Lucien (2013) *The Hidden God: A Study of Tragic Vision in the Pensées of Pascal and the Tragedies of Racine*. Translated by Philip Thody. London: Routledge.

Grene, David, Richard Lattimore, Mark Griffith, Glenn W. Most (editors) (2013) *The Complete Greek Tragedies* [nine volumes]. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. (1975) *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, Volume II*. Translated by T.M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Homer (1951) *The Iliad of Homer*. Translated by Richmond Lattimore. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Homer (2007) *The Odyssey of Homer*. Translated by Richmond Lattimore. New York, NY: Harper Perennial.

Humboldt, Wilhelm von (1969) *The Limits of State Action*. Edited by J.W. Burrow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kant, Immanuel (1991) *Political Writings* (2nd edition). Edited by Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kaplan, Robert D. (2023) *The Tragic Mind: Fear, Fate, and the Burden of Power*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kierkegaard, Søren (1987) *Either/Or I*. Edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Machiavelli, Niccolò (1989) *The Chief Works and Others*. Translated by Allan Gilbert. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Marx, Karl (1973) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.* Edited by Fowkes in Surveys from Exile. Translated by Ben, by David Fernbach. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. (1989) *The Spirit of the Laws*. Edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1995) *Unfashionable Observations*. Translated by Richard T. Gray. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Nussbaum, Martha Craven (2001, 2nd edition) *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pascal, Blaise (1995) *Pensées and Other Writings*. Edited by Anthony Levi. Translated by Honor Levi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pérez-Luño, Antonio E. (2013) 'Natural Law Theory in Spain and Portugal' in *The Threads of Natural Law: Unravelling a Philosophical Tradition*, edited by Francisco José Contreras. Dordrecht: Springer.

Stocker, Barry (2014a) 'A Comparison of Friedrich Nietzsche and Wilhelm von Humboldt as Products of Classical Liberalism' in *Nietzsche as Political Philosopher*, edited by Manuel Knoll and Barry Stocker. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Stocker, Barry (2014b) *Kierkegaard on Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Taylor, Charles (1975) *Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, Charles (1979) *Hegel and Modern Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thucydides (2013) *The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians*. Edited and translated by Jeremy Mynott. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tracy, Stephen V. (2009) *Pericles: A Sourcebook and Reader*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Vernant, Jean Pierre and Pierre Vidal-Naquet (1988) *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece*. New York, NY: Zone Books.

Vico, Giambattista (2020) *The New Science*. Edited and translated by Jason Taylor and Robert Miner. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Williams, Bernard (1993) *Shame and Necessity*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.