IQ

Isonomia Quarterly 4.2
Summer 2026

Globalizing the Philadelphian System: Unresolved Issues with Interstate Federalism

by Cruz K. Marquis & Christopher J. Coyne

ABSTRACT

This article responds to Christensen (2021), who proposes to revive the Philadelphian System, the institutional and security equilibrium that prevailed in the United States between the ratification of the Constitution and the Civil War, and expand it to the democratic world at large. We find unresolved empirical and practical issues with the proposal that require further research to address. Empirically, we identify three stylized facts of the system's only case study: It lasted less than one human lifetime, the catalyst for its demise was the American Civil War, and after the war, the state evolved into an unchained leviathan. The burden of proof is on the proposal's advocates to demonstrate that the record of the system would not apply to an expanded version. Practically, we identify four issues: Possible lack of legitimacy among prospective members, institutional stickiness, crypto-imperialism, and military integration creating an armed behemoth. We then identify success conditions of interstate federalism: Robust

safeguards against the centralization of power, legitimizing state power across heterogeneous groups, grounding the new institutions in local belief systems, and scaling military integration appropriately. It is unclear to what extent these conditions can be fulfilled, which points toward new avenues of research on international governance.

Keywords: Interstate federalism, Philadelphian System, Institutional stickiness, Public choice, Ratchet effect

Introduction

What international institutional arrangements allow for peace and social cooperation? Brandon Christensen (2021) proposed a unique framework for integrating large swaths of the Western liberal world into an extended version of American federalism, known as the Philadelphian System. The goal of his program is to transcend the Westphalian System by merging friendly nations into a single entity that would provide for collective security, foster cost-sharing, constrain the imperial presidency, and bolster liberty.

In this paper, we use Christensen's proposal as an entry point to consider some unresolved empirical

and practical issues with interstate federalism. Three empirical issues stand out. First, the only historical attempt to implement the Philadelphian System lasted less than one human lifespan and was one of several institutional and security environments of early America. This suggests that it may be unstable and fragile under endogenous shocks. Second, its collapse occurred during the American Civil War, suggesting that the system may have been partly causal for the war and that its eventual breakdown may have fostered violence. Third, this system was rightly held up as a paragon of liberty in its early days (though it clearly suffered from grievous imperfections, such as chattel slavery and the wars against the native peoples), but it has not stayed that way; instead, through time, the United States has transitioned from a minimalist state to an unchained leviathan.

Four practical issues pose additional challenges to the proposed system. The first is the problem of legitimacy in an era of contentious U.S. foreign policy. If the U.S. government is not seen as credible or as a threat to the global order, it is difficult to envision Western states surrendering sovereignty to a government they do not trust. The next issue concerns the concept of "institutional

stickiness" (Boettke et al. 2008), which posits that institutions foreign to domestic cultures and traditions will not function as intended. Interstate federalism, even if indigenously introduced, would likely be imposed in a top-down manner and thus, less likely to operate as desired by its proponents. A third issue relates to what Vincent Ostrom (1999) termed "crypto-imperialism," whereby powerful actors impose institutional arrangements under the guise of freedom. The risk is that the dynamics of power will make interstate federalism behave as a de facto American empire regardless of the benevolent intentions of its proponents. The final issue concerns the scale and scope of military power within interdisciplinary federalism. The proposed arrangement would create a massive armed leviathan that is greater than the sum of its parts. Even without bellicose intent, interstate federalism would alter the balance of power and could incentivize other powers, such as Russia and China, to reciprocate by arming, potentially precipitating a spiral of arms races, and even war (Jervis 1978; Tang 2009).

We proceed as follows. The next section examines the challenges posed by the empirical realities of the sole case study, the Philadelphian System. Section

three discusses the practical aspects of the proposal. Section four concludes with a discussion of the implications, including the success conditions for interstate federalism.

Empirical Challenges

The Philadelphian System, as a wholly American construction, has no exact precedents and no exact imitators, which makes studying its empirical record straightforward. We can identify three stylized facts. First, it was short-lived and was one among several security arrangements experienced by the young nation. Second, the catalyst for its demise was the American Civil War. Third, in the postwar period, it evolved into an unchained leviathan. Let's consider each in turn.

Understood as a unique security and institutional environment, the Philadelphian System began with the ratification of the Constitution and lasted until the Civil War, totaling less than one human lifespan (Deudney 1995). Although only one data point, this is cause for concern regarding its longevity if revived. Moreover, the discontinuous and abrupt switching between institutional and security environments raises the possibility that the Philadelphian System is an unstable equilibrium.

Christensen treats the Philadelphian System as a unique equilibrium; although distinct, it was not the only equilibrium in the evolution of American institutions. The century between the close of the French-Indian War and the end of Reconstruction (1763-1877) saw the United States and its precursors evolve from "loose empire" under British control, to "modified anarchy" under the Articles of Confederation, to the Philadelphian System, and eventually a "weak federal state" during the Civil War (Deudney 2007, 178). Early American history, therefore, had multiple institutional and security equilibria, with the Philadelphian System being one of several institutional phases.

At one level, the system's brevity and early America's rapid progression through multiple institutional and security equilibria are unsurprising. Institutions often evolve over time (North 1994). Institutions allowing for continuous adaptation to changing circumstances and existing in competition with other institutions can mitigate instability born from ossification (E. Ostrom 2010). But this calls for polycentric governance, interpreted broadly to include a diverse array of possibilities, rather than for interstate federalism, interpreted narrowly. It

also indicates that system designs that rely on the elimination or minimization of change impose greater strain than more adaptive systems with nested, multilayered governance.

Second, the Philadelphian System ended amid the disastrous Civil War that killed between 752,000 and 851,000 Americans (Hacker 2011), suggesting that the system may not be robust to endogenous shocks and crises. Of course, the causes of the Civil War are nuanced, and some have argued that the Philadelphian System collapsed into war because of the unique situation regarding power vacuums at the frontier and the contradiction between chattel slavery and a liberal society (Deudney 2007). This may be the case, but the burden of proof is on the proponents of interstate federalism to demonstrate the robustness of the system in the face of present and future pressures.

As for endogenous shocks, perhaps the most relevant one is the "ratchet effect", which elucidates how power advances in times of crisis (Higgs 1987, 2007). A crisis fosters public fear and calls for the government to "do something," thereby expanding the overall size (scale and scope) of government. Once the crisis ends, government size shrinks, but

remains above its pre-crisis level for two reasons. One is that ideologies regarding the proper role of the state shift, thereby normalizing larger government. A second is that new bureaus and interest groups have an incentive to maintain operations and resource flows. The Civil War, which brought an end to the Philadelphian System, is one example of the ratchet at both the federal and state levels (Hummel 2014). If the system is not robust to its endogenous shocks, such as the Civil War, it is not necessary to show it may be vulnerable to exogenous ones because the former is a lower bar to clear than the latter.

Third, the transition from the Philadelphian System to its successor entailed institutional change that reduced individual liberty while empowering the imperial presidency. The American Civil War was a bonanza of state-building to support the Union Army. Among other things, this served to entrench the standing army, expand conscription (Hummel 2014, 248–54), and accustomed the citizenry to militarism, while also permanently eroding the revolutionary quality of American liberty (Hummel 2014).

The war required the overall size of the state to expand to finance and organize the military colossus, which one scholar declared to be the "Largest, best equipped, best fed, and most powerful war machine ever assembled in the history of the world to that date" (Porter 2002, 258). While the military buildup was largely demobilized at the end of the war, the standing army that remained was substantially larger than its prewar size, even after the occupation of the south was long over (Stewart 2009, 327). This consolidation of force was increasingly brought to bear on Americans in labor disputes and wars against the Native Americans (Laurie and Cole 1997).

To limit federal greenback inflation, the Lincoln administration imposed a prohibitively high 10% tax on the issuance of banknotes by state-chartered institutions, which Selgin (2000) credits with ending free banking in the United States, thus establishing a de facto state monopoly on currency. After demobilization, there were twice as many civilian federal employees as there were before the war, necessitating higher expenditures to support the government's overhead costs (Porter 2002, 264). These, and numerous other, expansions in state power reflect the significant increase in the state's

capacity to shape and coerce society while restricting individual liberty.

It was the demise of the Philadelphian System that made the imperial presidency possible. The concept of the imperial presidency, defined by Schlesinger as an "inherent and routine presidential right," is typically traced to the latter part of the 20th Century (Schlesinger [1973] 2004, 13). But Lincoln set the stage for what would come later. Even the friendly portrayals of Lincoln describe his administration as a dictatorship (Kleinerman 2005), and there is a long list of expansions of executive power during his tenure. In the twelve weeks, he delayed the meeting of Congress after Fort Sumter was fired upon, he suspended habeas corpus, assembled the militia, unilaterally expanded the Army and Navy beyond their legally designated strength, arrested political enemies, and instituted a blockade of the Confederacy. Throughout the war, he unilaterally declared martial law, issued warrantless arrests, confiscated property, and suppressed dissenting newspapers without ever legally declaring war (Schlesinger [1973] 2004, 77–78). Precedent matters, and even today, when there are calls to give latitude to the president, Lincoln is invariably invoked (Kleinerman 2005). This suggests that the

groundwork for the imperial presidency was laid in the very act of the Philadelphian System's dissolution, indicating that the effects of the system's collapse were both immediate and long-term.

Practical Challenges

Interstate federalism faces practical issues that must be addressed for the system to operate as desired. One is the problem of legitimacy. The proposal suggests the place to begin interstate federalism would be in "Europe, East Asia, the Pacific Rim, and North America," (Christensen 2021, 443) while noting the places to avoid are those bordering rival great powers.

However, these same allies have become deeply skeptical of American intentions and commitment due to an unpredictable and bellicose U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration (Bergmann 2025). The reasons are multiple and include flirting with abandoning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or failing to live up to its Article 5 commitments (Ewing 2025), threatening to invade the NATO ally Greenland (Sobhan and Oelofse 2026), threatening to deactivate allied nations' F-35 fleets with a "kill switch," (Desmarais

2025), cutting off Ukraine's access to Starlink (Roulette et al. 2025), trade decoupling (Vohra 2025), and broader American-initiated trade wars (Grantham-Philips 2025). Given these behaviors, it is easy to see why allies would be reluctant to join the U.S. government in a venture that would seriously limit their sovereignty and potentially subordinate them to Washington. Hayek recognized the concern that states would not be willing to relinquish their sovereignty to join an arrangement of interstate federalism, which he regarded as one of the reasons it might be unworkable in practice (Caldwell 2022, 136–37).

A second issue related to institutional stickiness (Boettke et al. 2008). History matters because it delineates which institutional arrangements are feasible. This does not mean that change and alternative arrangements are impossible, but it does mean that institutional change does not occur on a blank slate. Many institutions are conceivable, but that does not mean they are feasible. Absent appropriate foundations to serve as a support structure, ideal institutions will fail to operate as intended and may cause significant harm. Institutions that emerge spontaneously from the actions of regular people, as opposed to outsiders,

are typically the strongest types of institutions because they are grounded in the beliefs and actions of the people who live under them. Importantly, assuming that the indigenous elites of each nation establish interstate federalism does not necessarily resolve the problem, as the institutional arrangement may still clash with the culture and ideology of ordinary people. Where a disjoint exists between top-down institutions and underlying realities, issues of instability and dysfunction will emerge.

Scholars from across disciplines have highlighted this concern. F. A. Hayek ([1970] 2014) warned of "rational constructivism," the pretense that institutions are better designed by planners from the top down rather than evolving through bottom-up processes. James Scott ([1998] 2020) cautioned against "high modernism" in the form of top-down, state-created plans meant to replace local arrangements. He highlighted how "seeing like a state" necessarily crowds out seeing like a citizen, displaces local arrangements, and often results in extensive harms.

In general, sharp institutional discontinuities bereft of precedent face serious difficulties in "sticking"

and avoiding unforeseen negative consequences, a point that has been common to the literature on social relations since Edmund Burke ([1790] 2008). This problem is only magnified when one recognizes the heterogeneity of societies with respect to their preferences, legal systems, customs, and widely dispersed, unaggregatable knowledge (Aligică 2014). While F. A. Hayek discussed the possibility of interstate federalism at a theoretical level, he also warned of falling prey to the fatal conceit, which is the belief that the world can be designed according to our wishes, noting that: "The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design" (Hayek 1989, 76).

While there is an ongoing quasi-federalist project in Europe through the European Union, Christensen (2021, 438) notes that it is not progressing well, a point supported by the experience of Brexit and the rise of populism. Further, there is no analogous program among American allies in East Asia. This paucity of precedent outside the United States and European Union, as well as the variation in the experiences of these two cases, raises important questions about the practicality of international federalism and its long-term sustainability if

adopted. Failure to appreciate Hayek's and Scott's warnings could result in significant negative consequences, including destabilizing the nations that attempted to adopt the proposed interstate federalism.

Public choice, which applies the economic way of thinking to political arrangements and activities, provides additional practical reasons for concern. Within interstate federalism, there is a risk of opportunism and abuses of power by elites, particularly in more powerful states. Vincent Ostrom (1999) warned of "crypto imperialism," whereby elites invoke the rhetoric of "freedom" and "democracy" while engaging in actions that seek to impose their preferred institutions and outcomes. From this perspective, interstate federalism could be understood as American sovereignty imposed on much of the developed world under the guise of being "voluntary". One might even say that this proposal does not abolish sovereignty, but instead, expands and consolidates it under American control.

Christensen dismisses this concern, noting that U.S. government domination would be uneconomic. "Yet the likelihood of the United States attempting to

dominate its clients and allies through blunt imperial coercion is incredibly low due to the high costs associated with such a policy" (Christensen 2021, 445). It's certainly true that empire is costly, but this alone does not ensure that it will not occur, as evidenced by the United States government's grand strategy and foreign policy (Coyne 2022; Wertheim 2020). Empire has been shown to produce dozens of "public bads," but this does not prevent its selection as a policy (Coyne and Davies 2007; Coyne 2022), with emphasis also placed on the "public goods" of the global broadcast of power (Lal 2004).

Regarding the long-term trends in the United States government's use of military force, one recent study concluded that the "US has increased its military usage of force abroad since the end of the Cold War. Over this period the US has preferred the direct usage of force over threats or displays of force, increasing its hostility levels while its target states have decreased theirs" (Kushi and Toft 2023, 772). This suggests that there is an empirical trend for American foreign policy to seek dominance that strengthened when its position in the world shifted in its favor after the end of the Cold War, a situation

that would be mirrored and magnified by interstate federalism.

Importantly, this is not a critique of the motivations of U.S. government policymakers. Even assuming complete benevolence on the part of U.S. officials, the realities of state power tend to nullify and pervert pure intentions, making it necessary to analyze such actions through the lens of "Politics without romance," rather than ideal theorizing (Buchanan [1979] 1999). American politicians are interested in expanding their sphere of influence, as Weberian politics entails a continuous striving for power (Weber 2004). This opens the door to political dynamics that include policymakers extracting rents (McChesney 1987), bureaucrats seeking a greater discretionary budget (Niskanen 2001), private firms lobbying to increase their profits (Smith 2022; Coyne and Hall 2019), and the erosion of constitutional constraints as policymakers seek to expand the scale and scope of their political power (Buchanan [1980] 2000; Higgs 1987). The practical concern about crypto-imperialism does not turn on the intent of state actors, but rather on the systemic incentives associated with the extension of state power.

Another practical concern relates to issues of scale and integration. It is not clear from the proposal for interstate federalism how the legal and military systems of dozens of heterogeneous states would interact or be amalgamated. The absence of a price mechanism in public administration precludes efficiency claims (Mises [1920] 2012, [1944] 2007; Boettke 2018). However, this may be a non-issue, given the possibility that the military systems of these states would integrate too well.

Consider the case of NATO, the American-led military alliance comprising thirty European nations and two North American nations (NATO 2024). The alliance is a case study in integrating the forces of different nations, and it suggests that interstate federalism, through the vehicle of force interoperability, would not pose a problem for the accumulation of military power; rather, it would facilitate it. Current NATO doctrine defines interoperability as a force multiplier, making its forces more effective than the sum of their parts, and emphasizes interoperability across systems, procedures, and human capital ("AJP-01" 2022). To make interoperability work, the alliance has adopted hundreds of Standardization Agreements (STANAGs), which cover everything from

"Equipment and procedures for air-to-air refueling; common sizes, safety rules and tests to make ammunition interchangeable; specifications to make national communications systems compatible; and formats to facilitate sharing intelligence and other information" (NATO 2022). If one assumes that interoperability, as a force multiplier, could be used by interstate federalism at least as well as by a decentralized alliance, there is reason to believe it could accumulate more hard power, creating a military behemoth.

One could argue, along Ostromian lines, that empirical evidence suggests that larger militaries may be less efficient than smaller ones for the same reasons larger police forces can be less efficient than smaller ones, making consolidation less attractive (E. Ostrom et al. 1978; Boettke et al. 2013). However, larger police departments also tend to have more coercive power, as suggested by the proliferation of SWAT teams and armored vehicles. If militaries mirror this tendency, interstate federalism would likely be able to muster more coercive power than the national militaries separately, and this may be enough to incentivize amalgamation.

If this integration were to occur, it might yield security benefits for members. Still, it could also yield a range of "bads" by reducing the costs of coercive use abroad, inspiring hubris and aggression among statesmen, corrupting the culture of interstate federalism members with militarism, and creating a security dilemma among international actors. This last point is especially relevant, as states operating in international anarchy can have difficulties signaling their true intentions with the accumulation of military force; even defensive buildups can be interpreted as having cloaked aggressive aims (Tang 2009). Since power is best understood in relative terms, a strengthening on the part of the West through interstate federalism would relatively weaken military rivals like Russia and China, making them interested in reciprocal arming (Jervis 1978). This suggests that interstate federalism would make the world less, rather than more, safe and secure, in contrast to advocates' claims.

Conclusion

The idea of interstate federalism is a creative attempt to deal with problems of security, executive power, and threats to liberty. If successful, it could

limit the feasible extent of central planning and limit discretionary power on the part of constituent governments while maintaining jurisdictional competition (Hayek 2021, 102–17) for prolonged periods of time and, in so doing, guarantee liberty to hundreds of millions of people. Further, the idea has a prestigious pedigree, with figures like Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek sometimes looking upon it as a potentially beneficial alternative (Haar 2022; Hayek [1944] 2007, 223–36, [1939] 1948; Mises [1941] 2000; Slobodian 2018, 91–120).

At the same time, the interstate federalism proposal introduces a range of empirical and practical issues that must be addressed. By highlighting these issues, we have also identified key conditions for the successful operation of interstate federalism. One is robust safeguards against the centralization of power and the potential for abuse and manipulation. These must be more than parchment-based constraints, which have historically been ineffective and short-lived. A second condition is to legitimize state power and organized coercion among a large number of heterogeneous people across vast territories.

Next, successful interstate federalism would need to find ways to navigate the challenges posed by institutional stickiness. Institutions that purport to reflect self-determination and individual consent cannot be imposed from above. Furthermore, for these arrangements to function as intended, they must be grounded in local belief systems. This fits with the advice to "Go slowly (but not too slowly) and to patch interstate federalism together rather than force the pieces to fit" (Christensen 2021, 443), and is in line with Burke ([1790] 2008) who argued sharp institutional discontinuities produce social discord. What this looks like in practice remains to be developed, and such exploration must endogenize politics to demonstrate how the system would work under worst-case conditions.

Finally, successful interstate federalism would include the appropriate scale of military operations to ensure net benefits not only to members, but globally. This is a challenging condition to meet since there is no test for determining efficiency, including the optimal provision of government-provided goods outside of the market context (Mises [1920] 2012). The burden on proponents of interstate federalism, then, is to make a convincing case that mechanisms exist for

governments to overcome the planner's problem and ensure that the potential "bads" of interstate federalism do not outweigh the potential goods. Whether these success conditions can be met remains an open question and points to the fruitfulness of scholarship on both interstate federalism and other alternatives to the current nation-state system of international relations.

Cruz Marquis is a PhD candidate in Economics at George Mason University. Send him mail: cmarqui4@gmu.edu. Christopher J. Coyne is, among other things, a Professor of Economics at George Mason University. Send him mail: ccoyne3@gmu.edu.

References

"AJP-01." 2022. NATO Standardization Office, December. https://www.coemed.org/files/stanags/01_AJP/AJP-01_EDF_V1_E_(1)_2437.pdf.

Aligică, Paul Dragoş. 2014. *Institutional Diversity and Political Economy: The Ostroms and Beyond*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199843909.001.0001.

Bergmann, Max. 2025. *The Transatlantic Alliance in the Age of Trump: The Coming Collisions*. February 14. https://www.csis.org/analysis/transatlantic-alliance-age-trump-coming-collisions.

Boettke, Peter J. 2018. "Economics and Public Administration." *Southern Economic Journal* 84 (4): 938–59. https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12265.

Boettke, Peter J., Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson. 2008. "Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 67 (2): 331–58.

Boettke, Peter J., Liya Palagashvili, and Jayme Lemke. 2013. "Riding in Cars with Boys: Elinor Ostrom's Adventures with the Police." *Journal of Institutional Economics* 9 (4): 407–25. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137413000118.

Buchanan, James M. (1979) 1999. "Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications." In *The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty*. Liberty Fund.

Buchanan, James M. (1980) 2000. *The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution*. Vol. 9. The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan. Liberty Fund.

Burke, Edmund. (1790) 2008. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Edited by Frank M. Turner. With Darrin M. McMahon, Conor Cruise O'Brien, Jack N. Rakove, and Alan Wolfe. Rethinking the Western Tradition. Yale University Press.

Caldwell, Bruce, ed. 2022. *Mont Pèlerin 1947 Transcripts of the Founding Meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society*. Hoover Institution.

Christensen, Brandon L. 2021. "Reviving the Libertarian Interstate Federalist Tradition: The American Proposal." *The Independent Review* 26 (3): 429–50.

Coyne, Christopher J. 2022. *In Search of Monsters to Destroy: The Folly of American Empire and the Paths to Peace*. Independent Institute.

Coyne, Christopher J., and Steve Davies. 2007. "Empire: Public Goods and Bads." *Econ Journal Watch* 4 (1): 3–45.

Coyne, Christopher J., and Abigail R. Hall. 2019. "Cronyism: Necessary for the Minimal, Protective State." *The Independent Review* 23 (3): 399–410.

Desmarais, Anna. 2025. "Can the US Choose to Switch off European Weapons?" Euronews, March 13. http://www.euronews.com/next/2025/03/13/can-the-us-turn-off-european-weapons-experts-weigh-in-on-kill-switch-fears.

Deudney, Daniel H. 1995. "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787-1861." *International Organization* 49 (2): 191–228. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830002837X.

Deudney, Daniel H. 2007. "The Philadelphian System." In *Bounding Power*. Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7sj7t.11.

Ewing, Giselle. 2025. "Trump Casts Doubt on NATO Security Agreement: 'If They Don't Pay, I'm Not Going to Defend Them.'" POLITICO, March 6. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/06/trump-nato-security-agreement-00216984.

Grantham-Philips, Wyatte. 2025. "Trump Launched Global Tariff Wars in 2025. Here's a Recap of His Trade Actions This Year." AP News, December 26. https://apnews.com/article/trump-tariffs-timeline-economy-2b10860dfdb2a5d9c3c4527136314992.

Haar, Edwin van de. 2022. "Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek: Federation as Last Resort." *Cosmos+Taxis* 10 (11+12): 104–18.

Hacker, J. David. 2011. "A Census-Based Count of the Civil War Dead." *Civil War History* 57 (4): 307–48. https://doi.org/10.1353/cwh.2011.0061.

Hayek, F. A. (1939) 1948. "The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism." In *Individualism and Economic Order*. The University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F. A. 1989. *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism*. Edited by W. W. Bartley III. Vol. 1. The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F. A. (1944) 2007. *The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents*. Edited by Bruce Caldwell. Vol. 2. The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. University of Chicago press.

Hayek, F. A. (1970) 2014. "The Errors of Constructivism." In *The Market and Other Orders*, edited by Bruce Caldwell. University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F. A. 2021. *Essays on Liberalism and the Economy*. Edited by Paul Lewis. Vol. 18. The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226781471.001.0001.

Higgs, Robert. 1987. *Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government*. Oxford University Press.

Higgs, Robert. 2007. *Neither Liberty nor Safety: Fear, Ideology, and the Growth of Government*. 1st ed. The Independent Institute.

Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers. 2014. *Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: A History of the American Civil War*. 2nd ed. Open Court.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30 (2): 167–214. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958.

Kleinerman, Benjamin A. 2005. "Lincoln's Example: Executive Power and the Survival of Constitutionalism." *Perspectives on Politics* 3 (4): 801–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592705050450.

Kushi, Sidita, and Monica Duffy Toft. 2023. "Introducing the Military Intervention Project: A New Dataset on US Military Interventions, 1776–2019." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 67 (4): 752–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221117546.

Lal, Deepak. 2004. *In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Laurie, Clayton D., and Ronald H. Cole. 1997. *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945*. Center of Military History, United States Army.

McChesney, Fred S. 1987. "Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation." *The Journal of Legal Studies* 16: 101–18.

Mises, Ludwig von. (1941) 2000. "An Eastern Democratic Union: A Proposal for the Establishment of a Durable Peace in Eastern Europe." In *The Political Economy of International Reform and Reconstruction*, edited by Richard M. Ebeling, vol. 3. Selected Writings of Ludwig von Mises. Liberty Fund.

Mises, Ludwig von. (1944) 2007. *Bureaucracy*. Edited by Bettina Bien Greaves. Liberty Fund.

Mises, Ludwig von. (1920) 2012. *Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth*. Ludwig von Mises Institute.

NATO. 2022. "Standardization." October 14. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/standardization.

NATO. 2024. "NATO Member Countries." March 11. https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/organization/nato-member-countries.

Niskanen, William A. 2001. "Bureaucracy." In *The Elgar Companion to Public Choice*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

North, Douglass C. 1994. "Economic Performance Through Time." *The American Economic Review* 84 (3): 359–68.

Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems." *The American Economic Review* 100 (3): 641–72. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.641.

Ostrom, Elinor, Roger B. Parks, and Gordon P. Whitaker. 1978. "Police Agency Size: Some Evidence on Its Effects." *Police Studies* 1: 34–46.

Ostrom, Vincent. 1999. "Crypto-Imperialism, Predatory States, and Self-Governance." In *Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis*, edited by Michael McGinnis. University of Michigan Press.

Porter, Bruce D. 2002. *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics*. Free Press.

Roulette, Joey, Cassell Bryan-Low, and Tom Balmforth. 2025. "Musk Ordered Shutdown of Starlink Satellite Service as Ukraine Retook Territory from Russia." *Reuters*, July 25. https://www.reuters.com/investigations/musk-ordered-shutdown-starlink-satellite-service-ukraine-retook-territory-russia-2025-07-25/.

Schlesinger, Arthur M. (1973) 2004. *The Imperial Presidency*. Mariner Books.

Scott, James C. (1998) 2020. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Yale University Press.

Selgin, George. 2000. "The Suppression of State Banknotes: A Reconsideration." *Economic Inquiry* 38 (4): 600–615. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2000.tb00039.x.

Slobodian, Quinn. 2018. *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism*. Harvard University Press.

Smith, Ron P. 2022. *Defence Acquisition and Procurement: How (Not) to Buy Weapons*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009189644.

Sobhan, Shakeel, and Louis Oelofse. 2026. "Trump Weighs Military Option to Take Control of Greenland." Dw.Com, January 7. https://www.dw.com/en/us-trump-weighs-military-option-to-take-control-of-greenland/a-75414829.

Stewart, Richard W., ed. 2009. *American Military History, Volume 1: The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, 1775–1917*. 2nd ed. Vol. 1. Army Historical Series. Center of Military History, United States Army.

Tang, Shiping. 2009. "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis." *Security Studies* 18 (3): 587–623. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410903133050.

Vohra, Anchal. 2025. "Europe's Economic Decoupling From America Is Underway." *Foreign Policy*, October 27. https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/12/eu-tariffs-trump-europe-economic-decoupling-america/.

Weber, Max. 2004. *The Vocation Lectures*. Edited by David Owen and Tracy B. Strong. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. Hackett Publishing Company.

Wertheim, Stephen. 2020. *Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.