

Trade Wars are Social Wars: Uniting the United States and its Allies Through Conflict

by Benjamin M. Studebaker

When the United States was created, security concerns played a major role. It was not for nothing that Ben Franklin popularized the famous moniker: *Join, or Die*. Once political death is off the table, federations become less interested in incorporating new member states on equal terms.¹⁰³ Instead, they leave new territories in various forms of political purgatory. Much attention is paid to how this affects US territories, such as Puerto Rico, but what about the case of the allied states?¹⁰⁴ There is an

¹⁰³ As I discussed previously three years ago in these pages. See Benjamin M. Studebaker, “Federations and Foreign Policy: The Quest for Koinon,” *Isonomia Quarterly* 1.3 (2023):

<https://isonomiaquarterly.com/archive/volume-1-issue-3/federations-and-foreign-policy-the-quest-for-koinon/>.

¹⁰⁴ For a particularly moving discussion of the shabby way Puerto Rican autonomists were treated in the years immediately following annexation, see Christina Duffy Ponsa, “When Statehood was Autonomy,” in: Gerald L. Neuman and Tomiko Brown-Nagin (eds.) *Reconsidering the Insular Cases*:

assumption that their independence is good for them, rather than a symptom of an American federation that has become increasingly tightfisted with regard to the extension of civil rights. Since it has been so long since the United States made any genuine offer of citizenship to any external territory, the possibility is scarcely entertained, much less seriously considered.¹⁰⁵ At this point, political actors are in the habit of operating from the premise that it cannot be done, and this makes it even harder to have a politically meaningful conversation about it. Despite this situation, Brandon Christensen perseveres, retaining a higher horizon for the American project, and bringing us together here to discuss its viability.¹⁰⁶ Often this discussion occurs at the level of history or philosophy, but in this piece, I will place a special emphasis on the context of the second Trump administration.

As the United States turns 250 years old, new events invite us to ask whether the citizens of the

The Past and Future of American Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), pp. 1-28.

¹⁰⁵ As you will see, I do not regard the overtures of President Trump to, e.g., Greenland, to have been genuine.

¹⁰⁶ Brandon L. Christensen, "Reviving the Libertarian Interstate Federalist Tradition: The American Proposal," *The Independent Review* 26.3 (2021/22): 429-450.

allied states enjoy sovereignty in any meaningful sense. In recent years, both the Biden and Trump administrations have used conflicts in Ukraine and in the Middle East to reduce the autonomy of the allied states. The Trump administration is now explicitly demanding that allied states make larger contributions to the provision of “global public goods.”¹⁰⁷ In practice, this means largescale purchases of American weapons and liquefied natural gas. The NATO member states (bar Spain), have agreed to increase their military spending from 2% of GDP to 3.5% by 2035, *en route* to a target of 5%. This is an enormous fiscal commitment that will place great strain on European social models. In 2016, Germany spent just 1.1% of GDP on defense.¹⁰⁸ As recently as 2024, it was still just beneath the old 2% NATO target, at 1.9%. Within the framework of a competitive global economy, it will not be possible to raise taxes to fund German

¹⁰⁷ Stephen Miran, “Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Stephen Miran on the Trump Administration’s Economic Agenda,” *Hudson Institute* (2025): <https://www.hudson.org/events/chairman-council-economic-advisers-stephen-miran-trump-administrations-economic-agenda>

¹⁰⁸ World Bank, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP) – Germany.” (2024): <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=DE>.

rearmament. Healthcare, education, housing, infrastructure, the trains—all will be in grim condition by the mid-2030s.

Battered by the Eurocrisis, COVID-19, and the Ukraine War, the allied economies have grown stagnant. But because the allied states lack political status within the American federation, American leaders have no political incentive to show concern for their plight. The regional organizations, like the European Union, have offered little protection. International organizations, like the World Trade Organization, are paralyzed. There seems to be no substantive resistance to American demands that will fundamentally and irreversibly alter allied ways of life.

Rather than advocate on behalf of their publics, European national governments have helped to sell the American demand for military spending as a kind of Euro-Gaullism. European leaders tell their citizens that investments in weapons will strengthen European foreign policy autonomy. But the decision to increase defense spending came at the behest of the Americans, who have been asking the Europeans to spend more on defense for decades.

The planned military spending will benefit the United States in three distinct ways:

1. Allied military spending will be used to increase, on paper, US exports to Europe, allowing the US administration to claim that it has improved the balance of trade.
2. Allied military spending will allow the United States to develop its military-industrial base without an increase in domestic defense spending.
3. Allied military spending will, more generally, relieve pressure on the American federal budget. This will facilitate federal tax cuts, subjecting Europe to even more competition on tax rates, significantly disadvantaging the Europeans across a wide range of sectors.

Under the US security umbrella, the allies have been able to spend multiple percentage points of GDP on other social priorities. US military spending has, over the past 70 years subsidized the development of unique, valuable forms of life in Europe and in Japan—forms of life that now stand endangered. But no one seems to notice. No one seems to care. And the idea that the Europeans

could defend their social model by further integrating with the United States? No one even raises it.

Until recently, Europeans regularly argued that military spending cannibalizes public services, unleashing dangerous social forces that pose a grave threat to liberty in Europe. In 1951, British Minister Aneurin Bevan resigned over a budget that contained military spending increases, arguing that “if in attempting to meet the military effect of those totalitarian machines, the economies of the western world are disrupted and the standard of living is lowered or industrial disturbances are created, then Soviet Communism establishes a whole series of Trojan horses in every nation of the western economy.”¹⁰⁹ In 1968, the future Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme argued that, “If we try to erect armored walls around the rich, then the road will lead to reaction and fascism in our cultural circle.”¹¹⁰ These old perspectives still echo in the

¹⁰⁹ Aneurin Bevan, HC Deb 23 April 1951 vol 487 cc34-43, *Parliament*: <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1951/apr/23/mr-aneurin-bevan-statement>

¹¹⁰ Olof Palme, “Translation of the Speech of Mr. Palme, Minister of Education, at the Vietnam Demonstration on 21 February, 1968,” *Olof Palme’s Archive*:

mouth of former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, who very recently argued that “the only way Europe can rearm is by shifting funds from its crumbling social and physical infrastructure – further weakening a Europe already reaping the bitter harvest of popular discontent, which is fueling the rise of far-right forces across the continent.”¹¹¹

Yet now, in the name of resisting Trump, these objections are begin abandoned. The Greenland episode operated as a kind of kayfabe, an illusory fight among friends, executed to extract a response from an audience of spectators who do not understand what they are watching. One would think, if it were really the case that the European leaders felt the president had threatened them, that they would pull out of NATO and demand the United States vacate its European bases. But they did no such thing, because nothing of the kind occurred. Indeed, when Mark Carney gave the famous speech at Davos announcing that it was time to take down the “sign in the window” for the

https://olofpalme.arbark.se/wp-content/dokument/680221c_vietnamdemonstration.pdf

¹¹¹ Yanis Varoufakis, “The Case Against European Rearmament,” *Project Syndicate* (2025):

<https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2025/03/25/the-case-against-european-rearmament-project-syndicate-op-ed/>.

international system, he hastened in the Q&A to reinforce and exhibit his commitment to NATO:

Clearly NATO is experiencing a test right now, and the first response to that test has to be to respond in a way that ensures the security of the Arctic, in a robust way, for all possibilities. This is actually a point that we have been making in recent years. It's a point that I made at the NATO summit back in June, which seemed like a pledging summit, but also was, uh, to get NATO policies in the right direction. So, I think in the immediate term, one of the imperatives is to reinforce things that Canada's doing, Nordic Baltic 8 are doing, the UK are doing, other NATO partners, France included, in a comprehensive way that provides much greater security in the Arctic. This is the test, and so I wouldn't say—the NATO sign stays in the window, but we've got to meet the moment for that.¹¹²

¹¹² The relevant time stamp:
<https://youtu.be/CQOr9FcSf-M?si=86LwHMCvv7uuHQSU&t=1298>

If all of this pledging and reinforcing is happening within the framework of NATO, that means it's all being done with the cooperation of the United States. The notion that NATO defense spending can be anti-American or anti-Trump ought to be self-evidently ridiculous, but the state of public discourse is so far regressed that national leaders feel they can get away with just about anything. In the past few months, the German chancellor scolded German workers for being insufficiently productive, the French president sang *La Marseillaise* over a nuclear submarine, and the British prime minister lamented the lack of military spending by the previous Conservative government, even as he proposes to cut jury trials for minor offences to save money.¹¹³ In each of these cases, security

¹¹³ James Angelos, "Merz calls on Germans to work more—and draws a withering backlash," *Politico* (2026): <https://www.politico.eu/article/friedrich-merz-calls-on-germans-to-work-more-and-sparks-a-fierce-backlash/>; Emmanuel Macron, "President delivers speech on France's nuclear deterrence," *French Consulate in the United Kingdom* (2026): <https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/president-delivers-speech-frances-nuclear-deterrence/>; Nick Gutteridge and Tom Cotterill, "Starmer refuses to give timeline for 3pc defence spending," *The Daily Telegraph* (2026): <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2026/03/23/starmer-fails-to-give-timeline-defence-spending-increase/>.

competition has become the focus of the domestic policy discussion.

There is another way to think about this situation. What if, instead of an illusory fight among friends, we had a *true* fight among friends—a Social War? Rather than accommodate the United States while pretending to be committed to sovereignty, the Europeans could refuse to cooperate with the United States unless and until they receive political status within the American federation. If the Europeans are going to be made to pay for American tax cuts and for American military spending increases, they are going to be, in effect, *taxed* by President Trump. And, since there can be no taxation without representation, the European allies are entitled to political representation in Washington. To demand their political rights, the Europeans could wage a trade war against the United States. But to succeed in this struggle, the Europeans would first need to want to succeed and to take the necessary steps to remove the obstacles that stand in the way.

Towards a Theory of a 21st Century Trade War

In the 20th century, trade wars were fought for nationalist reasons. Nation-states aimed to generate

an industrial base or defend their foreign policy autonomy by reducing reliance on international trade. Trade wars of this kind tended to reduce economic growth, produce security tension, and contribute to the launch of military conflicts. These were trade wars fought *en route* to real wars.

It would not make sense for Europe to fight a 20th century trade war. There is no possibility of Europe becoming economically autonomous, not in the globalized international system. Nor is there any need for Europe to protect a nascent industrial base. None of the old arguments are at play here.

The purpose of a trade war in the 21st century could not plausibly be decoupling or autarky. It would need to be fought instead for the purpose of reconfiguring the political framework in which trade occurs.¹¹⁴ Rather than use trade wars to decouple the United States from China or to bully China into accepting American trade terms, as the Trump administration has sought to do, a trade war could be used to force the United States into political integration with—at least—its allies.

¹¹⁴ Drawing loose inspiration from Michael Pettis and Matt Klein, *Trade Wars are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020).

Ultimately, this integration would permit more trade, in the long run, between the United States and the allied states. Indeed, this trade would be more sustainable, because it would be possible to govern it—the US and its allies would be able to adopt common tax, wage, and regulatory frameworks, reducing the intensity of commercial competition within the international system. Instead of generating new, intense forms of security competition, the aim would be to open up new cooperative possibilities that the present system forecloses *a priori*.¹¹⁵

What if it were possible to have a commercial iteration of the Roman Social War? In the first century BC, Rome fought a military conflict with the *socii*, the independent cities of Italy that were allies of Rome.¹¹⁶ The Romans “won” the war on the military level, but they granted Roman

¹¹⁵ For a discussion of the benefits of supranational federalism, see Benjamin M. Studebaker, “Why Federalism: The Conclusion,” *Streit Council* (2025): <https://www.streitcouncil.org/post/why-federalism-the-conclusion>.

¹¹⁶ For a quality discussion of the Social War, see E. Gabba, “Rome and Italy: The Social War,” in: J.A. Crook et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History Volume IX: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146-43 BC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 104-128.

citizenship to the citizens of the Italian cities. This allowed for much more intense military and commercial cooperation within Italy, strengthening the Roman Republic in the long-term. It also set a precedent for incorporating additional territories. The Romans learned that they could grant citizenship to people they had, at one time, regarded as strange foreigners. This greatly expanded their understanding of who could be Roman, allowing them to integrate territories much further away with populations with whom they had much less in common, at least at the start. By 212 AD, all free men within the territory of the empire held citizenship, from Britannia to Egypt and from the Black Sea to Morocco. No one would have imagined this could be possible 300 years earlier. But it was made possible because the Italian allies were both willing to rebel and willing to remain partners under fair terms of cooperation at one and the same time. They did not insist on the chimera of independence, something politics can never have as long as they engage in substantial social relations with one another.

In ancient times, wars were fought with pointy objects, and it was possible to struggle for political rights by military means with limited human and

environmental costs. Modern warfare is far too destructive to be the instrument of this transformation. It not only does horrific damage to human life and property, but also to trade and to future social relations. It would be ridiculous on both a moral and material level even to suggest that the Europeans fight a military conflict with the United States in the 21st century. I am not, in any way, suggesting any such thing.

But something like this could be done commercially, at the level of trade. The Europeans could refuse to trade with the United States until a framework is in place for the recognition of their political rights. Such a “war” could be fought at the level of tariffs or even an embargo.

The Americans could, in principle, respond by giving up their military bases and vacating the continent. European leaders seem to fear this outcome. They seem to think the Americans do not benefit from the alliance system. They forget that the Americans supported the Europeans in post-war development and in the construction of their social systems precisely because the Americans sincerely valued having allies in Europe. Indeed, the United States helped European workers obtain economic

rights (e.g., to healthcare) that were never granted to Americans. The Americans fought World War II because they did not want to see Europe united under Nazi Germany, and they fought the Cold War because they did not want to see Europe dominated by the Soviet Union. The Americans still do not want to see Europe develop into an empire or fall under the sway of an Asian hegemon. The Americans may claim that they see little value in the alliance system, hoping to extort military spending from gullible, cowardly Europeans who are unwilling to stand up to them. But this is a bluff that could be called.

The Energy Obstacle

To be able to fight a social trade war with the United States, the Europeans would need to overcome a variety of obstacles. The most obvious of these is the newfound reliance on the United States for energy, in the form of liquefied natural gas. This dependence has sprung up over just the past decade. There was no possibility of relying on the United States for energy until the Obama administration committed to shale oil drilling.¹¹⁷ It

¹¹⁷ For a good discussion of the role of energy in international politics, see Helen Thompson, *Disorder: Hard Times in the*

wasn't until the Ukraine War that the Europeans stopped buying Russian oil and began importing LNG from North America in large quantities. And it was only earlier this year that the European Union committed to purchasing \$750 billion in US energy resources.¹¹⁸ All of this is very new.

The Third Gulf War is now further disrupting energy markets, pushing even Japan to ask the United States for Alaskan LNG.¹¹⁹ Japan plans to invest in American energy production and then import the LNG it has paid to drill. The cost of the LNG will be offset by Japan's stake in the drilling companies. So, in the near-term, such a deal appears to be in the Japanese interest. But over time, exposure to the American energy industry is likely to engender a Japanese dependence on American energy akin to the European dependence. This kind of relationship reduces the capacity of these allies to use commercial leverage to make political demands.

Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).

¹¹⁸ Annalisa Villa and Matt Hoisch, "EU parliament approves US trade deal with strict safeguards," *EUROMETAL* (2026): <https://eurometal.net/about-eurometal/>.

¹¹⁹ NHK, "Sources: Japan mulls asking US for Alaskan oil," *NHK* (2026): https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20260317_700/.

It is not just that the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East can be used to extract defense spending from allied states, they can also be used to force allied states to increase their exposure to the American energy market. A social trade war would require genuine ability to source energy from elsewhere. So, the wars in Ukraine and in the Middle East are not only crippling the allies, they are crippling the capacity of the allies to resist this crippling.

But in recent years, many allied states have endorsed the continuation of the Ukraine War, despite the effects that conflict has on their energy security. They have also refrained from investing in domestic alternatives. Germany and Japan closed their nuclear power plants in the 2010s. Japan is slowly reopening its facilities.¹²⁰ But Germany has ruled this out, making the bizarre claim that it cannot reverse decisions taken by previous governments.¹²¹ In Japan, the same governing party

¹²⁰ Koh Ewe, “Japan restarts world’s largest nuclear plant as Fukushima memory looms large,” *BBC* (2026): <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cq6v0v32rg1o>.

¹²¹ Jens Thurau, “Germany won’t return to nuclear power, chancellor says,” *DW* (2026): <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-nuclear-power-plants-europe-an-union-energy-policy/a-76305267>.

that shut the plants is now reopening them, but in Germany there have been multiple changes in party leadership since the decision was taken in 2011. But even this is not even enough for Germany to reverse course. Today, nearly every allied state faces higher energy costs than the United States, with British, German, and Italian households paying twice as much for electricity as their American counterparts.¹²²

What can the Europeans do? They could cooperate with Middle Eastern states to improve pipeline infrastructure in the region. They could find a *modus vivendi* with the Russians that will permit the permanent lifting of sanctions and a resumption of service on Eastern European pipelines. They can invest in alternative energy sources. But they have to do these things for the right reasons. If they do them for the wrong reasons, they will replicate the problems they face in a new form.

¹²² “Cost of Electricity by Country 2026,” *World Population Review* (2026): <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/cost-of-electricity-by-country>.

The Gaullist Obstacle

Suppose the Europeans embark upon a policy of reducing energy dependence on the United States. At present, what would be the reason for such a policy? I submit to you that it would likely be legitimated in terms of sovereignty and autonomy. The Europeans would argue that they need to pursue energy security so that they can be autonomous from the United States. This is true up to a point—the Europeans need enough energy autonomy to be able to credibly negotiate with the United States. But if the Europeans did become genuinely autonomous from the Americans, then NATO would disintegrate and the Europeans would be on the hook for a replacement security solution. This would force them to spend at least as much on defense as the Americans are presently demanding.

It's one thing if the Europeans invest in pipelines and power plants *instead of* planes and projectiles, with a view to making political demands that will secure their form of life. But if they invest in pipelines and power plants *and* planes and projectiles, this will only deepen the crisis their social systems face. So, the purpose of energy investments cannot be ending security cooperation

with the United States. The Europeans have to be able to wage a trade war while maintaining security cooperation. They have to remain allies.

The trouble is that this argument is a little counterintuitive. It seems that the United States is trying to destroy the European social model with its demands. So, how could political integration with the United States defend that model? It would seem, at first blush, that political integration with the United States would just accelerate a process of Americanization.

But what I'm suggesting here is that resistance to Americanization is what leads to it—attempts to avoid political integration leave Europeans with no voice in American decisions that fundamentally alter their way of life. This leaves the United States free to reshape Europe in accordance with North American interests. Since the Europeans do not actually have the power to resist this process, their refusal to participate in it leaves them subject to it. And even if the Europeans did find a way to create their own empire, they would do so by building a United States of Europe—a federal entity with a large European army and ever more limited social system. Such a Europe would have to compete,

militarily and economically, with the United States. That competition would lead to a Europe that looks and talks and acts exactly like the United States. In the name of preserving Europe, Euro-Gaullism would utterly destroy it.

Conversely, it is only possible to preserve the European way of life in and through Americanization. It is only by participating in the Americanization process that the Europeans can play a role in shaping the outcome of that process. It does not have to be as bad as it has been so far—it has only been as bad as it has been because the Europeans have declined to demand citizenship from the regime to which they are subject.¹²³ An American president who is politically responsible to European publics would have to care about European economic growth. Such a president would have to think twice before starting wars that undermine European supply chains, raise European energy costs, and kick off refugee crises on Europe's doorstep. Imagine how much richer Europe would be today if, over the past 30 years, it

¹²³ For more on the dialectical “citizen-subject,” see Étienne Balibar, “Citizen Subject: Foundations for Philosophical Anthropology,” Steven Miller (trans.) (New York: Fordham, 2016).

had exercised its rights. What would the Europeans have done with all that wealth? What would they have inspired others to do? Unfortunately, we will never know.

The Americans have lost the capacity to imagine a more expansive horizon for their project. Some are retreating into provincial ideologies, tying American identity to ethnicity or religion. Other Americans recoil from these perspectives, but respond only with self-hatred and self-flagellation. There is no inspiring American vision of the future. All the tech sector can conjure are so many fantasies about new Cold Wars with China, fought with hordes of droids, funded by allied defense budgets.

The United States cannot renew itself. It can only be renewed by its allies. But for the allies to play this role, they must recognize both sides of a dialectic—they will never break free from the fate of the American system, but they do have the power to shape that fate, if they commit wholeheartedly to the task.

Benjamin M. Studebaker received his PhD in Politics and International Studies from the

University of Cambridge. Send him mail:
bmstudebaker@gmail.com.

Works Cited

- Angelos, J. (2026) “Merz calls on Germans to work more—and draws a withering backlash,” *Politico*, <https://www.politico.eu/article/friedrich-merz-calls-on-germans-to-work-more-and-sparks-a-fierce-backlash/>.
- Balibar, E. (2016) *Citizen Subject: Foundations for Philosophical Anthropology*. S. Miller (trans.) Fordham.
- Bevan, A. (1951) HC Deb 23 April 1951 vol 487 cc34-43, *Parliament*, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1951/apr/23/mr-aneurin-bevan-statement>.
- Christensen, B.L. (2021/22) “Reviving the Libertarian Interstate Federalist Tradition: The American Proposal,” *The Independent Review* 26 (3): 429-450.
- Ewe, K. (2026) “Japan restarts world’s largest nuclear plant as Fukushima memory looms large,” *BBC*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cq6v0v32rg1o>.
- Gabba, E. (2008) “Rome and Italy: The Social War,” in: J.A. Crook et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History Volume IX: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146-43 BC*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 104-128.
- Geo News English and Geo News (2026) “PM Mark Carney speaks at World Economic Forum | Geo News English,” *YouTube*,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CQOr9FcSf-M&t=1298>.

- Gutteridge, N., and Cotterill, T. (2026) “Starmer refuses to give timeline for 3pc defence spending,” *The Daily Telegraph*,
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2026/03/23/starmer-fails-to-give-timeline-defence-spending-increase/>.
- Macron, E. (2026) “President delivers speech on France’s nuclear deterrence,” *French Consulate in the United Kingdom*,
<https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/president-delivers-speech-frances-nuclear-deterrence>.
- Miran, S. (2025) “Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Stephen Miran on the Trump Administration’s Economic Agenda,” *Hudson Institute*,
<https://www.hudson.org/events/chairman-council-economic-advisers-stephen-miran-trump-administrations-economic-agenda>
- NHK (2026) “Sources: Japan mulls asking US for Alaskan oil,” *NHK*,
<https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20260317700/>.
- Palme, O. (1968) “Translation of the Speech of Mr. Palme, Minister of Education, at the Vietnam Demonstration on 21 February, 1968,” *Olof Palme’s Archive*,
https://olofpalme.arbark.se/wp-content/dokument/680221c_vietnamdemonstration.pdf.
- Pettis, M., and Klein, M. (2020). *Trade Wars are Class Wars*:

How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace. Yale University Press.

- Ponsa, C.D. (2015) “When Statehood was Autonomy,” in: G.L. Neuman and T. Brown-Nagin (eds.) *Reconsidering the Insular Cases: The Past and Future of American Empire.* Harvard University Press, pp. 1-28.
- Studebaker, B.M. (2023) “Federations and Foreign Policy: The Quest for Koinon,” *Isonomia* 1 (3): <https://isonomiaquarterly.com/archive/volume-1-issu-e-3/federations-and-foreign-policy-the-quest-for-koinon/>.
- Studebaker, B.M. (2025) “Why Federalism: The Conclusion,” *Streit Council*, <https://www.streitcouncil.org/post/why-federalism-the-conclusion>.
- Thompson, H. (2022). *Disorder: Hard Times in the Twenty-First Century.* Oxford University Press.
- Thurau, J. (2026) “Germany won’t return to nuclear power, chancellor says,” *DW*, <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-nuclear-power-plans-european-union-energy-policy/a-76305267>.
- Varoufakis, Y. (2025) “The Case Against European Rearmament,” *Project Syndicate*, <https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2025/03/25/the-case-against-european-rearmament-project-syndicate-op-ed/>.
- Villa, A., and Hoisch, M. (2026) “EU parliament approves US trade deal with strict safeguards,” *EUROMETAL*, <https://eurometal.net/about-eurometal/>.
- World Bank (2024) “Military Expenditure (% of GDP) –

Germany,” *World Bank*,

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=DE>.

World Population Review (2026) “Cost of Electricity by Country 2026,” *World Population Review*,

<https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/cost-of-electricity-by-country>.