by Scott Duryea
Liberal democracy has historically expanded through two primary mechanisms: the gradual adoption of market economies and democratic institutions by existing states, or the creation of new political entities through independence movements. However, a third pathway exists, one that has received limited scholarly attention despite its theoretical appeal. Interstate federalism proposes that existing independent states or secessionist regions might voluntarily incorporate into an established federal system, thereby extending constitutional protections of individual liberty to populations currently outside their reach. Proponents of this approach argue compellingly that such expansion could dramatically increase the number of people living under constitutional protections while simultaneously reducing international fragmentation and the conflicts that arise from it. Christensen (2021) articulates this vision persuasively, advocating for a “shift in vision for libertarians and classical liberals” that would “reject Westphalian national-state sovereignties and embrace instead the counterintuitive logic of the Philadelphian federal order” (445). Under this model, states would voluntarily shed their sovereignty in exchange for joining the United States, becoming subnational units while enjoying the stability of American liberal institutions.
But this theoretically appealing vision must confront substantial historical and political realities. The post-World War II international order has been characterized by the freezing of borders and the near-universal resistance of states to territorial loss, making peaceful transfers of sovereignty rare (Tilly 1990). When they succeed, secessionist movements typically pursue full independence rather than subordination within another federation. Existing states view secession within their own borders as an existential threat to their territorial integrity and national identity. These obstacles raise fundamental questions about the legitimacy of collective decision-making, the protection of dissenting minorities, and the appropriate role of external powers in supporting such movements. This essay examines how interstate federalism might be pursued while remaining consistent with libertarian principles of non-aggression and non-interventionism. It argues that while the obstacles are formidable, a carefully designed policy framework grounded in democratic consent, respect for individual rights, and strict adherence to non-interventionist principles could theoretically advance this vision without compromising liberal values (Rothbard 1978).
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Scott Duryea is Associate Professor of Security and Global Studies at American Public University System. Send him mail: sduryea@protonmail.com.
Isonomia Quarterly 